Convegno Internazionale: Ritratto di Northrop Frye

Scholars from around the world gathered at the Villa Mirafiore in Rome, Italy, on 25 May 1987 for a three-day congress—“Portrait of Northrop Frye”—devoted to examining his work. The large audience that attended the conference heard papers by twenty-six critics from five countries—Italy, the United States, England, Denmark, and Canada. Frye himself inaugurated the conference by presenting a paper entitled “Maps and Territories.” The proceedings of the conference, which are included in the bibliographical supplement in this issue, are scheduled to be published within the next year. The conference received little attention in the Canadian press. But in Rome reporters and TV cameras were very much in evidence, and the Italian newspapers devoted a generous amount of space to the conference. Frye was interviewed by Masolino d’Amico for La Stampa and by Loretta Innocenti for alfabeto; and, in connection with the congress, articles by Beniamino Placido appeared in La Repubblica, by Agostino Lombardo and by Giorgio Fabre in l’Unita, by Donata Aphel in Il Tempo, by Roberto Mussapi in Il Giornale, and by Alessandro Gebbia in Avanti!. In addition, the Socialist journal, MondO, devoted a special section to Frye in its July 1987 issue, publishing articles by Lombardo, Gebbia, Baldo Meo, and Piero Boitani. Two bibliographies were prepared for the conference, “Northrop Frye: per una bibliographia italiana” by Alessandro Gebbia and Baldo Meo and “Northrop Frye: Translations, Articles, and Reviews in Italian” by Robert D. Denham. The department of English at the City University of Rome, which sponsored the congress, presented an exhibit of Frye’s books at the Villa Mirafiore.

The interest in Frye’s work among Italians, who have translated ten of his books (another three translations are in progress), is widespread, and the attention he received at the 1987 congress was reminiscent of his 1979 three-week lecture tour of Italy, which took him to Milan, Vicenza, Padua, Venice, Florence, and Rome. During the former visit he spoke to capacity audiences, and his presence

Frye’s visit to St. Peter’s on 24 May 1987 marked his first return to the cathedral since 1939. During the earlier tour he, his wife Helen, and an Oxford schoolmate had to make a hasty exit from the country because of the rising tide of Mussolini’s power.

**Frye at the 1987 MLA Convention**

As a way of paying tribute to Frye’s achievement during the year of his seventy-fifth birthday, the English Programs office of the Modern Language Association organized two sessions on his work for the 1987 annual convention of the MLA in San Francisco, 27–30 December. The more than three-hundred who attended heard Frye speak on “Auguries of Experience.” Other papers were by Paul Hernadi (“Ratio Contained by Oratio: Northrop Frye on the Rhetoric of Nonliterary Prose”), Hayden White (“Ideology and Counterideology in the *Anatomy*”), Patricia Anne Parker (“What’s a Metaphor?”), Hazard Adams (“Essay on Frye”), David Staines (“Northrop Frye in a Canadian Literary Context”), and Imre Salusinszky (“Frye and Romanticism”). Efforts are currently underway to publish the proceedings of the two sessions.

**Northrop Frye Centre**

In April 1988, Dr. Eva Kushner, president of Victoria University, announced the establishment of the Northrop Frye Centre at Victoria. The purpose of the Centre is to support projects of research in the human sciences, conferences, and a public lecture series. Its eventual goal is to establish an endowed chair “to perpetuate the thought and teaching of Northrop Frye.” Until funds are available for this, Dr. Kushner hopes to bring a visiting professor “to publish, teach or conduct research at Victoria” (Vic Report 17 [Autumn 1988]: 5). The Centre will be directed by a committee at Victoria University and an advisory board. Inquiries about the Centre may be addressed to Dr. Eva Kushner, President, Victoria University, Toronto, Ontario M5S 1K7.

**Framework and Assumption**

*by Northrop Frye*

The following essay, published with the kind permission of Northrop Frye, was originally presented as the opening talk of a conference at Smith College, 24 October 1985.

As this conference is concerned with convention and knowledge, I should like to begin by talking about the role of convention in literature. A convention is an aspect of the identity of a work of literature: it is what makes it recognizable for what it is, and it is also the aspect that welcomes and invites the reader. Conventions may appear in minor roles within other conventions. In *Romeo and Juliet*, for instance, the great Courtly Love convention that dominated so much of the Middle Ages extends only to the Romeo-Rosaline affair that precedes the action of the play. Convention can even be merely a traditional custom, like the *topoi* used so much in medieval literature or the fourteen lines of the sonnet. When the convention is big enough to include the entire work, we call it a genre, and this is the aspect of convention I shall be mainly concerned with. A genre establishes the identity of a work of literature in two ways: it indicates what the work is, and it suggests the context of the work, by
placing it within a number of other works like it. Any large bookshop will illustrate the role of genre in reading by dividing its stock into sections labelled science fiction, detection, romance, Westerns and the like. Such divisions continue the role of convention in inviting the reader: if you want this kind of book, the label says, here is where you find it.

In ordinary speech convention implies that a thing is just like a lot of other things. This may be a reason for feeling indifferent to certain conventions: it is also a reason for feeling interested in certain others. I know of no reason, beyond the whims of personal taste, why members of one convention should impel us to say “they’re all much the same,” and why members of another should rouse our interest in distinguishing all the variety we can. The only criterion I can think of is the number of normal conventions that have to be sacrificed to keep a central one intact.

For example, I was once in the shop of an old and cranky bookseller who had put up his labels according to his own reactions, which were precritical. One such label read, simply, “Filth.” There were some books approaching pornography in this section, and they started me thinking about pornography as a genre. Most pornography plays down the traditional conventions of story line, characterization, description and comment, and confines itself to a prodding of certain reflexes or an evoking of certain fantasies. Such things are always formulaic, and the formulaic represents convention at its most primitive, a level at which the work may emerge, like the popular songs in Orwell’s *1984*, untouched by human intelligence. I notice too that in bookstores and publishing houses the categories of genre have been uninfluenced by critical theory. I glanced at a row of books by Carlos Castaneda recently, and saw that the earlier books were labelled “non-fiction” by the publisher and the later ones “fiction.” I dare say an interesting story lies behind that, but as the earlier and the later books appeared to be generically identical, the distinction was of little critical use.

There is a certain amount of snobbery among some readers tending to assume that a book is of minor importance if its genre is easily recognizable, like the science fiction and detective stories just mentioned. The detective story, in particular, is written in a convention that follows certain prescribed rules, and so resembles a game, like chess. That is nothing new in literature, though earlier rules-of-a-game conventions were usually smaller in range and mostly confined to verse. At present there is a widespread impression that flexible conventions are a mark of serious writing. The days are gone when Jane Austen could protest against the snob-phrase “only a novel,” and point out that a “novel” could be on the same level of seriousness as any book of sermons. But of course she had her conventions: there are no writers who are unconventional or beyond convention. Sometimes a writer may seem unconventional because his readers are accustomed to different conventions and do not realize it, or else assume that what they are used to is the normal way of writing. Such reactions to convention may vary from Samuel Johnson’s dictum, “Nothing odd will do long: *Tristram Shandy* did not last,” to the claim of a twentieth-century formalist critic that *Tristram Shandy* was the most typical novel ever written.

Browning’s poem on Andrea del Sarto, called “the faultless painter,” makes the point, among others, that faultlessness can itself be a fault. The reason is that if a painter can be called faultless it means only that the particular convention he followed has come to a dead end. When this happens, all the critics who decided that other painters were “faulty” because their grasp of the convention was less complete are swept into the dust-bin of the history of taste. Today we try to be more liberal and eclectic in our responses, but government and other boards entrusted with the duty of giving grants to promising artists still often respond only to certain fashionable conventions, so that artists who are interested in different conventions have to go without grants until the fashion changes. The word “beauty” has become suspect as a critical category, because it has meant, so often and for so long, conforming to an established convention. In the nineteenth century there were still critics who assumed that the Greeks had invented beauty in their statues and architecture, and that everything pre-Greek or outside the Greek tradition was deliberately and perversely ugly.
Thirty years ago, when I wrote the Anatomy of Criticism, I paid some attention to the question of genres, because I felt that lack of careful attention in that area made for many confusions and illiterate critical judgments. The wheel of fashion that moves the history of taste has turned since then, though that does not mean that the issues involved have turned with it. I now frequently encounter objections to my alleged passion for ticketing and labelling things, where reference to an excessive toilet training in my infancy is clearly being suppressed with some reluctance. But when I turn to other areas of critical theory, and am informed, for example, that the privileging of interdiscursivity problematizes the differentializing of contextuality, I do not feel that I am being released from an obsession. I only feel that I am facing different conventions about what it is important to find names for.

I think of literature as a specific field of imaginative activity, but the metaphor of “field” I have in mind is something like a magnetic field, a focus of energy, not a farmer’s field with a fence around it. I also think of genres as fields in the same way. A literary genre being a part of literature, that means, as long as we hang on to the farmer’s field metaphor, a smaller field with a smaller fence. Hence we instinctively think of Shakespeare, for instance, as a poet who wrote mainly plays, rather than as a dramatist who used mainly verse. That will sound like a quibble only to those who do not understand the issues involved. A modern reader of Shakespeare may be put off by the dullness he finds in the Henry VI plays, the brutality of Titus Andronicus, the anti-Semitism of The Merchant of Venice, the sexism of The Taming of the Shrew, and so on through a large part of the canon. The point is that all these plays, whatever our present ideological values, are superb theater, and with Shakespeare the actable and the theatrical always come first. If we had been Shakespeare, we feel, we would have used the theater for higher and nobler purposes. Shakespeare never used the theater for anything except putting on plays, which is one reason why he is Shakespeare. The surrender to the genre, the entering into its conventions as they were at his time, is the mark of the professional craftsman, who outlasts most of the well-meaning amateurs.

In Shakespeare’s day schoolboys were trained in the three parts of trivium, grammar, meaning Latin grammar, rhetoric, and formal logic. Deductive logic became increasingly arid with the rise of science and its more inductive attitude, along with the growing suspicion that the syllogism yielded no new knowledge. The decline of rhetoric continued through the eighteenth century and was fairly complete by the Romantic period. Grammar, even English grammar, declined in the twentieth century, partly through the influence of linguists who maintained that the English grammar taught in schools was still Latin grammar, English analyzed in a way that had no relevance to the real structure of English.

I have thought about this a good deal, and my present view is that the linguists were pedagogically wrong: I think that English grammar should be taught from the point of view of a more highly inflected language, Latin being the obvious one. Such a training gives an insight into the structure of English that cannot be obtained from English alone, and it also provides an elementary introduction to philosophical categories, the concrete and abstract, the universal and particular, and the like, which the student will be encountering all his life. But this is by the way: the essential point is that in the twentieth century writers learn to write mainly by instinct and practice, supplemented by the study of older writers who had, or took, greater educational advantages, such as Joyce and Pound. As a result the conventions of writing are acquired but not learned, and while this may be an advantage for some kinds of writers, it makes the general bulk of contemporary writing more conventional than ever. A writer who has studied and practiced certain conventions may develop more distinctive and individual ways of handling them; a writer who does not know that he is being conventional becomes a mass voice in a mass market.

As a result of the collapse of the trivium there grew up an attitude to the arts represented by the title of a book by Herbert Read, The True Voice of Feeling. This was a refinement of the Carlyle view that all writing was the personal rhetoric of the author. Jacques Derrida would quickly recognize it as
one more way of using writing in order to denigrate writing. I spent ten years reviewing poetry in Canada, where the doctrine of the true voice of feeling was the established one, and had ample experience of the monotony that resulted. I noted with interest the other day that one or two Canadian poets were talking of basing more of their poetic themes on the routine work of their society, on the jobs people held and the way their social functions affected their imagination. They had finally realized, after a steady downpour had been going on for half a century, how many Canadian poets were still as obsessed by certain sexual themes as the most pedantic Elizabethan sonneteer.

This is a far cry from the day when a poet would begin his work by making an appeal to the Muses. The great advantage of the Muses was that they were confined to specific generic categories: if you wanted to write a love lyric there was Muse for that (Erato), but you wouldn’t call on Calliope or Clio, otherwise it might take you twelve books to get to your first orgasm. The poet who is his own Muse, regarding his own imagination as an unconditioned will like Calvin’s God, gains a facile victory over nothing: he has no angel to fight with, like Jacob. Walter Benjamin connects this autonomous aesthetic with fascism: I would not go as far as that, though I can see some of the affinities. And I would certainly not want to leave the impression that all Muses are soft cuddly nudes: some of them are ravening harpies who swoop and snatch and carry off, who destroy a poet’s peace of mind, his position in society, even his sanity.

I think I understand what Derrida means by the use of writing to denigrate writing, though I hesitate to draw the portentous inferences from it that some of his disciples do. What I find much more difficult to understand is the continuous use of criticism to denigrate criticism, the continued assumption that literary criticism has no skeleton, and cannot stand up unless some philosophical or psychological construct provides one. If we start by regarding criticism as parasitic on literature, we invariably end by regarding literature as parasitic on the other verbal structures that convey actual information. Again, language is certainly one of the contexts of every verbal discipline, but to obliterate all distinctions between reader and poet, between criticism and creation, between literature and other verbal structures, because they are all forms of language, seems to be to fall under the law in the Book of Deuteronomy that says “Cursed be he that removeth his neighbor’s landmark.” There are many distinctions that may be difficult, even impossible, to establish in theory that are none the less essential to employ in practice. Ignoring them transforms all the products of language into a vast alphabet soup in which those two essential letters, Alpha and Omega, in the beginning and the end, are nowhere to be found. There is no reason in the mind of God or the design of nature why I should now be in an area called Massachusetts, but life would get very confusing without such arbitrarily designated areas.

I notice that an increasing number of literary critics are moving outside the literary field and developing interests in other verbal disciplines. Some of them, including myself, are following the lead of Kenneth Burke’s pioneering study, *The Rhetoric of Religion*. Of the many reasons for my growing preoccupation with the Bible, two are particularly relevant here. One is that a literary critic, in studying metaphor is confined to the hypothetical metaphor of literature, the statement of identity that remains purely verbal and simultaneously denies what it asserts. The Bible expands metaphor into what might be called existential metaphor, the actual identifying of a conscious subject with something objective to itself. As Shakespeare’s Theseus ought to have said, every human being is of imagination all compact. The other reason is the double perspective the Bible presents: from one point of view it is a completely unified whole of metaphor and imagery, and from another it is totally decentralized. It continually, in other words, constructs and deconstructs itself.
I see a writer or a work of literature as at the center of a cross like a plus sign. The horizontal bar represents his historical and cultural situation, the assumption that he was bound to make as a man of his time, the ideology he was bound to reflect when he wrote. The vertical bar represents the literary tradition from which he descended and the continuing of that line of descent to ourselves. Let us look at the horizontal line first. It runs in theory from complete acceptance of the social and ideological environment the poet is in to its complete rejection. In practice nobody could live continuously at such extremes, and there is always some conflict within the mind of the writer himself. This, rather than the influence of a predecessor, seems to me to constitute the primary anxiety besetting a poet. Certainly an influence can also be an anxiety, but I should call this a special factor in a writer’s struggle with his contemporary culture, rather than putting it on the socially isolated Freudian basis that Harold Bloom does. Gerard Manley Hopkins, for example, found himself in conflict with the prevailing ethos of Victorian England, and adopted a dogmatic Catholic position partly in opposition to it, partly for the positive values it supplied in place of the negative reaction. But the religious position he adopted was a terrifying anxiety in itself, however much we as readers may profit from the tensions it created. Other poets, Tasso, Gogol, Rimbaud, have had their lives shattered or drastically altered by similar tensions.

Of course it is obvious that we cannot keep horizontal and vertical dimensions separate: Hopkins’s Catholicism had also a great deal to do with the literary traditions he attached himself to. But again there are practical distinctions. To take the next step I must return to a point made in the Anatomy of Criticism. Young writers huddle together in schools and issue manifestoes, announcing their conventions as something new, or as about to produce something new. As they grow older and acquire more authority, they do not become less conventional, but their notions of convention become more deeply rooted in the history of the art and are less a reflection of a contemporary fashion in ideology. It is at this point that the really crucial form of originality comes into view. Painters of the Barbizon school in nineteenth-century France followed certain easily recognizable conventions, though they achieved a great deal of individual variety within them. When we come to Manet, we feel that we have got past those conventions and are on something new. But after a while we realize that the new, though certainly new, is also deeply traditional. There is a deeper link with certain painters of the past, Goya, Velasquez, Rembrandt, being established. This aspect of tradition forms the vertical bar of my diagram: it refers to the traditions of the art rather than to contemporary situations. But, unlike the more obvious conventions linking the Barbizon painters with one another, there is a discontinuous quality in the larger historical tradition. Something that has disappeared for years or centuries may suddenly reappear; conventions long ignored or forgotten suddenly materialize again, like the angels who traditionally do not move in time or space but simply become visible somewhere else.

It seems to me that this historical relationship is an integral part of an artist’s or writer’s relation to us. What might otherwise be an insoluble mystery, the way in which a writer incredibly remote from us in time, space, social conditioning and cultural assumptions can still make imaginative contact with us, becomes intelligible when we remember that we are still living within the history of literature and the other arts, and can recognize the current of that history flowing into us. It should go without saying that this current is not only that of the Western tradition, but includes Oriental and other cultures as well. If we are interested in our ancestry, it is natural to trace our direct ancestry first, but we all know that we eventually come to a point at which everyone alive was an ancestral relative.

If we keep this cross diagram in mind, it may give us some understanding of the artist’s situation vis-à-vis his own time. In studying, let us say, Shakespeare, we confront a dramatist working around 1600 in a society with very different assumptions and organization from ours. We cannot study him intelligently without noting the nuances that the differences in social rank among his characters bring into the dialogue, nor without allowing for the prejudices and cultural preferences his audience brought into the theater with them. Without this context of Shakespearean scholarship, we simply kidnap Shakespeare into our own age, and judge him by all the prejudices and assumptions that “we”
bring into the theater with us. At the same time, there is still the mystery of how such a writer does communicate with us, and for that we need a different dimension from the one provided by a knowledge of Elizabethan ideology. That communicating ability, it seems to me, is the other half of the historical relation to the dramatists and other writers of earlier ages, starting with his immediate precursors of the Greene and Lyly period, and going back to the great Greek writers. This is a genuinely historical relationship, but it cannot all be reached by historical methods, as Shakespeare did not know the Greek tragic writers directly and knew the formulas of Menandrine comedy mainly in prose romance distortions. Here only a comparative generic analysis will establish the relation.

I can understand the fascination of what Roland Barthes calls the zero degree of writing, the impulse to rid oneself of all conventions and confront one’s subject directly. I can understand Picasso’s remark that it was easy to learn to paint like Raphael but very difficult to learn to paint like a child. In a related field, I can understand the nostalgia of Husserl for an abandoning of preconceived mental categories and an unimpeded view of things in themselves. In painting, again, we prize the work of the so-called primitives because of their freshness of insight, their freedom from second-hand formulas, from stock pictorial quotations and allusions. But if we look at a collection of primitives, we see the same doll-like figure drawing, the same psychedelic coloring, the same crowding of detail in the composition, over and over again. Directness of vision is not for us: everything objective is also in part a mirror, and human creation is an ontogenetic development that must recall its phylogenetic ancestry before it can bring it to life once more. Adam may have had a direct vision of reality on the sixth day of creation, but after the seventh day the world became conventionalized to God himself. I think the cult of unmediated vision really relates to something quite different.

I have often enough insisted that every human society exists within a cultural envelope that separates it from its natural environment: that there are no noble savages, and no men sufficiently natural to live in a society without such an envelope. Most people call this envelope an ideology, which is accurate enough for fairly advanced societies. The word ideology suggests argument as well as ideas, because of the Hegelian principle that every proposition contains its opposite. That is why a writer living in his own ideology is subjected to stress and anxiety: thesis and antithesis are bound to be in his mind at once. I suggest that an ideology is a secondary and derivative structure, and that what human societies do first is make up stories. I think, in other words, that an ideology always derives from a mythology, as a myth to me means \textit{mythos}, a story or narrative. I am speaking of course of story types, not of specific stories.

It is mythology that we find in primitive societies, and mythology that we find at the historical beginnings of our own, and it is again mythology that underlies our present ideologies, when we examine them closely enough. In Shakespeare’s day the Christian ideology his contemporaries accepted was a derivation from Christian mythology, the story Christianity had to tell from its sacred books. In our day we are surrounded by various historical ideologies, progressive and revolutionary, Jeffersonian and Marxist, but these go back, in their inception, to various forms of comic plot superimposed on history. I think also that the poet, in particular, has an instinct for the mythological core of his culture and goes directly to it to try to recreate it so far as he can. The quest for unmediated vision, then, is really a quest for the recovery of myth, the word-hoard guarded by the dragons of ideology.

The growth of an ideology in society is a product of concern, a word that I find very difficult to define or even describe, but which I hope is to some degree self-explanatory. It is our concern for living in social units that builds up societies into nations to be defended in war, into religious confessions to be maintained by enforced agreement and the persecution of dissidents, into class structures where the different strata of society have different rights and privileges. These are, it seems clear, secondary and derivative concerns, and the ideologies that maintain them are based on rationalization. The primary concerns underlying them are simpler: they are the concerns for food, for shelter, for sexual relations, for survival; for freedom and escape from slavery; for happiness and
escape from misery. Paul Tillich distinguishes the religious concern as “ultimate”: it may be that, but it can hardly be primary. One cannot live a day without being concerned about food, but one may live all one’s life without being concerned about God. At the same time one hesitates to rule out the conscious and creative concerns from the primary ones. When a society comes close to the level of bare subsistence, and has no leisure or technology for the so-called “frills,” the arts, including the literary arts, do not disappear: they leap into the foreground among the essentials for survival. Examples range from paleolithic cave-drawings to Inuit (Eskimo) life today. Again, the opening sentence of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, “all men by nature desire to know,” seems to me to put the expanding of consciousness, too, on its proper primary footing.

All through history secondary concerns have taken priority over primary ones. The primary concern for survival has to give way periodically to going to war; the concern for a sexual partner gives way to the demands of celibacy enforced by a religion or by certain other types of social calling. I say “all through history,” and in fact history itself is created by the continuity of such secondary concerns. Literature obviously reflects these ideologies in every period, but they enter literature as elements of content, not as forms or shaping principles. The conventions and genres of literature are essentially untouched by them: these seem to look back to the earlier mythological time, some of them, like the pastoral, looking very longingly and nostalgically to them. Certain mutations of genres take place as the social structure alters and the reading public changes: it is clear, for instance, that the classical novel as we know it rose along with a certain kind of bourgeois reading public in the eighteenth century, and will disappear with the disappearance of that class. But the middle-class novel was not a new entity in literature: it was a new format for story-telling, and the shape and pattern of the stories told remained much the same.

What we said earlier, that ideology is primarily an anxiety to a writer and not a guide to the form of what he should write, makes it not surprising that so many of the best and most influential writers, Balzac, Dostoievsky, Ezra Pound, D.H. Lawrence, should have adopted such bizarre, even perverse, forms of ideology. It is clear that their mythological interests, the kinds if imaginative themes that preoccupied them, fitted very awkwardly and uneasily into the ideological structures confronting them.

The historical nature of ideology makes it quite feasible to study the history of ideas, but, as explained earlier, the history of mythology is more discontinuous. The best we can do with mythology is to try to sketch out the large interlinking patterns in it, and when we do this we find a curious affinity between mythology and primary concerns. Because of the unorthodox methods that are essential, those who deal with the informing role of mythology in literature often seem close to being cranks. Frazer’s *Golden Bough*, for instance, while it is by no means as fundamentally wrong and full of holes as some anthropologists and Classicists say, is still a very valuable book. None the less it retains its fascination as a book that brings an astonishing number of mythological patterns into alignment with one of the primary concerns: the food supply, more particularly the agricultural supply. Frazer’s dying god cycle has an intimate connection with a female figure who usually represents the earth as the dying god does the vegetation. Frazer leaves out most of her mythological role: Graves’s *White Goddess*, another vulnerable book, attempts to fill this in. However, the primary sexual concerns of humanity are reflected more directly by modern psychologists when they touch on mythology, as they often do. The work of Freud and his followers, orthodox and heretic, is of course indispensable here. Jung moved further away from the sexual concern than most of the others, even though his biggest, most complex and most totally unintelligible book is called *Mysterium Conjunctionis*. Some works in archeology, such as G. R. Levy’s *Gate of Horn*, deal with the primary concerns of providing shelter for the living, the dead, and the gods.

Because the history of mythology rides on top of, or gets submerged under, actual history, it suggests a state of innocence or Golden Age that we do not look for in actual history. Every age had
cruelty and horrors parallel to our own, but we can still read their literature and look at their visual arts with pleasure. This is partly because the creative imagination suggests an intimacy with the natural environment which emerges in the metaphorical structures of poetry, metaphor being the language of identity. In its more pastoral and romantic genres it creates a nature that responds to human desire; in its more tragic and ironic ones it surveys the human situation from a point of detachment. The language of ideology is metonymic: it urges that this particular structure of authority is the closest we can get to the ideal one, and so is being “put for” the ideal.

The twentieth century saw in its earlier years a very explicit and conscious revival of mythological themes in its literature, especially in the group of writers who peaked around 1922, the year of *Ulysses* and *The Waste Land*. What happens in the arts indicates what is going to happen in the world a generation or so later, and from mid-century on we have come to realize, from the nuclear bomb and from the polluting of the supply of drinkable water and breathable air, that our age is the first in history to exhibit clearly the principle: primary concerns must become primary, or else. Some people in various parts of the world, including this one, may still think it highly desirable to go to war to smash somebody else’s ideology, but the primary concern with human survival tells us that we cannot afford such gestures any more. And for the first time the primary concern is beginning to speak with authority.

It seems, then, if this argument has any cogency, that criticism, the theory of the language of myth and metaphor in which primary concern expresses itself most directly, is very far from being the game of trivial pursuit that it so often appears to be. In the title of my paper, “Framework and Assumption,” the “framework” is the ideological structure, or the great variety of them, surrounding us in the contemporary world. Such frameworks, whether religious or secular, are reasonably well known in their general outlines. Studying the assumptions on which they are based brings us to the mythological structures from which they are derived, and which literature recreates directly. We have no coherent surveyed maps of the “here be dragons” type. It has been recognized at least since Sir Philip Sidney’s time that because literature, the mythological imagination at work in the world, makes no assertions, it escapes from argument and refutation. In criticism, of course, as in any theoretical field, disagreement is as essential and as creative as agreement is. Subordinating it to primary concern means only that it should be kept impersonal. None the less the vision of a created order where, in Blake’s phrase, “no dispute can come,” is essential to the total picture.

If we are working solely on the basis of ideology, and regard it as the basis from which literature and the other arts emerge, we shall eventually come to a vision of humanity as a crazy Oedipus obsessed by two overmastering desires: to kill his father God and to rape his mother Nature. By “his father” I mean the source of his life, whether we call it God or not. For such a rabid animal, as Gulliver’s Houyhnhnm master told him, reason is simply a faculty that intensifies his viciousness. With the mythological perspective, we can see ourselves capable of creation as well as destruction, with reason a means to an end of ultimate consensus, however distant. In that perspective, what this conference is studying, the role of convention in knowledge, becomes more intelligible. The two meanings of the word convention coincide: the convention is the agreed-on place of meeting for a community, where variety and difference are always needed, where individual distinctiveness is as prized as it is anywhere, but where the total disruption caused by wholesale commitment to secondary issues cannot break in.

**Frye Bibliography**

The material that follows is a supplement to *Northrop Frye: An Annotated Bibliography of Primary and Secondary Sources* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987). The entry numbers, as well as the
cross-references (C2, M10, etc.), either follow or extend the system of classification in that book. Many of the references have appeared since 1987; some, especially Italian materials, were omitted from the earlier book. For many of the Italian materials I am indebted to Alessandro Gebbia and Baldo Meo's list, “Northrop Frye: Per una bibliografia italiana” (8 pp. typescript). For the Hungarian translations and articles my thanks to Tibor Fabiny. Items I have not seen are preceded by an asterisk. Readers are invited to send me copies of materials for inclusion in the next bibliographic update. (Ed.)

Part One: Primary Sources

A. Books


C. Monographs


D. Essays and Parts of Books


G. Interviews and Dialogues

G58. “Northrop Frye: An Interview with David Lawton.” *Australasia* 66 (Nov. 1986): 249-59. F replies to questions about language, myth, history, and archetype, primarily as these issues relate to his understanding of the Bible. F was interviewed at the University of Sidney on the occasion of his visit to Australia during the summer of 1986.

G59. Interview by Peter Gzowski on CBC Morningside program, 30 March and 1 June 1986. 20 minutes. F responds to questions about his schooling, the Bible, the turning points in his life, Shakespeare, and his role as a public or popular critic. The interview was occasioned by the publication of Northrop Frye on Shakespeare. See P15.

G60. “Northrop Frye.” *Criticism in Society* by Imre Salusinszky. New York: Methuen, 1987. 26-42. F answers a series of questions about the difference between ideology and “concern,” the empirical study of literature, critical factions, the work of Harold Bloom and Jacques Derrida, the poetry of Wallace Stevens, the university and academic freedom, Marxism, specialization in criticism, and the landmark events in his life.


Interviewer: Bert Archer. F, among others, comments on the function of art: it deals with both primary and secondary concerns.
See also the entries under Brady and Dirda in Section P

H. Recordings

F replies to a series of questions about the media, culture, and F’s own career. This tape has been transcribed by Robert Denham.


I. Manuscripts


I212. “Auguries of Experience.” [1987] Typescript, 11 pp. Provides a general overview of the critical questions that have been at the center of his life as a critic from the time of his early interest in Blake to The Great Code. Contrasts his conception of theory (“a vision or conspectus of the area of literature, an area distinct from, though with a context relating it to, the other arts and the other forms of verbal discourse”) with the ideas of theory generally held. Notes that his own work has tended to focus on critical consensus, rather than on ideological causes, and on the totality of mythical and imaginative forms. Observes that his study of the Bible reversed the process of his earlier work in that it began with the structure of the biblical text and moved outward to literature. Presented as a talk at the annual convention of the Modern Language Association, San Francisco, 28 December 1987.

I213. “A Unique Achievement.” [1987] Typescript, 3 pp. A recollection of Don Harron’s student days, especially his interest in drama, and his later career as a radio and television talk-show host. Forthcoming in a volume being presented to Don Harron.

I214. “Some Reflections on Life and Habit.” [1988] Typescript, 21 pp. Beginning with Samuel Butler’s conviction that habit and unconscious learning are part of our evolutionary heredity, F develops an analogy between Butler’s biological speculations and human learning. Maintains that unconscious memory, developed by habit and practice, is more fundamental than conscious memory because it permits genuine freedom and spontaneity in learning. Conscious memory, “the recall of an event of the past into the present,” is also essential for education, but when it becomes an end in itself, as in some recent educational best-sellers, learning is in danger of becoming merely a repetitive exercise. “The function of knowledge is to set free the capacity to experience.” When we see education, then, as “a process of continuing discovery,” we will come to understand that education cannot be founded solely on experience, because it requires the knowledge that comes from both conscious and unconscious memory; knowledge that brings the past into the present only in rote ways is hardly knowledge at all. Originally presented as the F.E.L. Priestley Memorial Lecture at the University of Lethbridge, 17 February 1988. Publication forthcoming from the University of Lethbridge.

Part Two: Secondary Sources
K. Books and Collections of Essays


K4. Addition to the reviews of Eleanor Cook et al., eds., *Centre and Labyrinth: Essays in Honour of Northrop Frye*.

K9. A comprehensive treatment of F’s criticism by A.C. Hamilton is forthcoming from the University of Toronto Press. The book, which will have six chapters, is organized on the plan of the *Anatomy*. Hamilton’s general purpose is to examine F’s work in its historical context. A major work: thoroughly researched and written with sensitive understanding. It will become the standard by which subsequent efforts to measure the historical contours of F’s thought will be judged.

K10. A book containing the proceedings of the Italian conference devoted to F’s work, which took place in Rome, 25-27 May 1987, is forthcoming.

L. Essays and Parts of Books

L589. Adams, Hazard. “Essay on Frye.” Paper presented at the 1987 convention of the Modern Language Association, San Francisco, 28 Dec. Typescript. 9 pp. Seeks to clear up an apparent contradiction in F’s work: F declares that literary criticism is a science but he also associates his own work with the genre he calls the anatomy. The anatomy dissects literature into its constituent parts but also incorporates all forms into itself. F’s method of “turning the insides out” is typical of such poets as Blake and Yeats. Insofar as the *Anatomy* offers a vision of a beautiful and functioning world, it becomes a work of art.


of transcending the static binary oppositions so rampant in structuralism, whose practitioners Frye seems to both resemble and overreach.” Believes that F’s “range, depth, and complexity make [his] presence on the theoretical scene hard to ignore, even many years later,” and notes that Frye is expressly cited by thirteen of the fourteen other critics whose works are examined in this survey.

L594. Bell-Villada, Gene H. “Northrop Frye, Modern Fantasy, Centrist Liberalism, Antimarxism, Passing Time, and Other Limits of American Academic Criticism.” Reinventing the Americas: Comparative Studies of the Literature of the United States and Spanish America, ed. Bell Gale Chevigny and Gari Laguardia. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1986. 278-97. Claims that F is not interested in process or change, that his system of modes cannot accommodate fantasy, and that he does not accept the contributions of Marxism. Thinks that F’s criticism, therefore, is of little use in understanding Latin American literature.

L595. Berman, Art. “Scientific Criticism: Frye.” From the New Criticism to Deconstruction: The Reception of Structuralism and Post-Structuralism. Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1988. 96-101. Maintains that F wants to develop a scientific criticism but not at the expense of the idea of human freedom. In this respect his work lies firmly in the tradition of American criticism, especially in its reaction to structuralism in the U.S.: once it comes up against the logical consequences of empiricism and determinism, it interjects the humanistic idea of free will. F’s work differs from that of the structuralists and post-structuralists in that it develops no theory of mind or self and has “no sophisticated linguistic theory.”


L603. Carroll, William C. The Metamorphoses of Shakespearean Comedy. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1985. 38-40. Reviews F’s theory of metamorphosis in Shakespeare’s comedies in order to show how it reveals “structural connections among all kinds of transformations.” Contrasts F’s approach with his own, which is “to discover how metamorphosis works in the comedies rather than to prove that they all coincide with a certain structural pattern.” Agrees with F, however, that Shakespeare’s late plays do reflect the basic structure of romance, the most fundamental dramatic genre.


L606. Chambers, Aidan. “Letter from England: Cracking The Great Code.” Horn Book 60 (Apr. 1984): 242-47. Recommends The Great Code to teachers who are concerned that their students have little knowledge of Bible stories. Praises F’s “elegant arrangement of the subject matter, the clarity of his thinking, and the evidence it gives of a fine critical intelligence at work.” “[J]ust as Frye has learned from the best literature how to express himself (this is one of the least jargon-ridden works of criticism I’ve read in years), so he has learned that the most effective communication happens through stories. His book is a story; the book he is talking about is a library of stories; and like all the best criticism his makes you want to go back to the original text and read it again for yourself.”


L608. Cherpack, Clifton. “Positivism, Piety, and the Study of Voltaire’s Philosophical Tales.” The Eighteenth Century: Theory and Interpretation 24 (Winter 1983): 23-37 [25-26]. Looks at the way that Frye, among others, categorizes the conventional form of Voltaire’s tales by placing them in the rich tradition of Menippean satire. Finds, however, that the some of the tales do not fit F’s descriptions because Voltaire “had a habit of combining elements derived from different literary forms within a single tale.”


L614. Daiches, David. Critical Approaches to Literature. 2nd ed. London: Longman, 1981. Examines F’s work in the context of archetypal criticism by summarizing the method in the first three essays of Anatomy of Criticism. Sees this method as reductive, even though it “can help to show what literature is and how it works.”


L616. Das, B. “Myth Criticism and Its Value.” Twentieth-Century American Criticism Interdisciplinary Approaches, ed. Rajnath. New Delhi: Arnold-Heinemann, 1977. 242-55. Points out the significance of myth criticism as practiced by Frye and others (Wheelwright, Chase, and Ferguson). Says their approach “enables us to see that myth is an expression of man’s deepest concern about himself and his place in the scheme of the universe, his relationship with man, nature and God.”

L617. Davis, Robert Con. “John Barth and Imitation: The Case for a Post-Structuralist Mimesis.” Fabula 3 (March 1984): 21-47 [21, 27-28, 47]. Sees Barth’s self-referential fiction, which is said to be similar to the post-structuralists’ idea of the self-referentiality of language, as set over against the conception of mimesis found in F, among others. F, like Aristotle, Auerbach, Booth, and Watt, holds to a realistic view of imitation that lies between the substantialism of (say) Plato and the post-structuralism of Derrida, Barthes, and Genette.


L623. Docherty, Thomas. On Modern Authority: The Theory and Condition of Writing, 1500 to the Present Day. Sussex: Harvester; New York: St. Martin’s, 1987. 91-93, 122-23. In a chapter devoted to a revisionary reading of Shakespeare, Docherty finds F’s distinction between comic and tragic modes helpful, but he takes issue with F’s understanding of the way that the familial, social, and sexual relationships in Shakespeare’s comedies work themselves out. Glances also at F’s idea of the “green world” of comedy, which Docherty also finds present in Shakespeare’s tragedies.


L626. Druff, James H., Jr. “Genre and Mode: The Formal Dynamics of Doubt.” Genre 14 (Fall 1981): 295-307 [299-302]. Believes that F’s distinction between genre and mode is too clear-cut and that we can understand better some of the disharmony in the forms of modern fiction if we see the two concepts as related, genre having a historical dimension and mode a rhetorical one.

L627. Dyrkjøb, Jan Ulrik. “Northrop Frye’s Visionary Protestantism.” Paper presented at the international conference in Rome devoted to F’s work, 25-27 May 1987. Typescript. 15 pp. Maintains that “in important respects the structure of [F’s] thinking can only be fully appreciated if it is seen in a theological context.” Argues against the views of Fredric Jameson (who claims that F reductively allegorizes history) by showing that F’s typological reading of the Bible always involves a complex double thrust—a dialectic that moves toward discontinuity and radical transcendence and that, therefore, places his work in the tradition of visionary Protestant theology.


L631. __________. “Northrop Frye: la letteratura come utopia e le utopie letterarie: studio di The Stubborn Structure.” Atti della accademia della Scienze dell’Instituto di Bologna 65, no. 2 (1976-77): 103-20. Places the concept of utopia, with its power to construct visions of other and different worlds, at the center of F’s critical work.


L636. _________. “Una, due (o nessuna) solitudine.” *Letterature d’America* 2, no. 7 (Spring 1971).


L640. Hernadi, Paul. “Ratio Contained by Oratio: Northrop Frye on the Rhetoric of Nonliterary Prose.” Paper presented at the 1987 convention of the Modern Language Association, San Francisco, 28 Dec. Typescript. 13 pp. Argues that the ideas in the last section of the theory of genres in the *Anatomy* prefigure several current concerns in the study of texts, including the question whether literature can be distinguished from nonliterature. Concludes that F’s answer to the question is ambiguous: ratio both contains and is contained by oratio. In this respect F differs from both the formalists, who see clear distinctions between the literary and the nonliterary, and the poststructuralists (e.g., de Man and Eagleton), who do not.


L643. Jayne, Edward. “The Rise and Fall of New Criticism: Its Brief Dialectic History from I.A. Richards to Northrop Frye.” *Amerikastudien* 22, no. 1 (1977): 107-22 [116-18]. Sees the history of the New Criticism as represented by a dialectic: at one pole is Richards, with his emphasis on affective judgment; at the other is F, who with his emphasis on formal archetypal principles and the conventions of literary structure, represents the final stage in the codification of the New Criticism.


L645. Kent, Thomas L. “The Classification of Genres.” *Genre* 16 (Spring 1983): 1-20 [2-6]. An analysis and critique of F’s theory of genre, which, because it rests on the psychological and anthropological principle of wish-fulfillment, “does not adequately describe the formal conventions of a specific genre, nor does it explain how different conventions function together to generate new genres.” Within the context of archetypal criticism, “Frye’s model is unsurpassed.” But because it fails to account for both generic synchronicity and diachronicity, it is incomplete.
L646. Kermode, Frank. “Frank Kermode” [an interview with Imre Salusinszky]. Criticism in Society by Imre Salusinszky. New York: Methuen, 1987. 100-21 [105-8]. Responds to questions about his own estimate of F’s work: he “is certainly the finest prose writer among modern critics.” “Not much that he’s done since Anatomy of Criticism has interested me very much, because the great mass of it was filling in the detail [of that book], or developing the themes in different areas.” Comments also on F’s views on the experience of reading and value judgments.


...statement.”


L650. Leitch, Vincent B. “Systematics of Myth Criticism.” American Literary Criticism from the Thirties to the Eighties. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1988. 136-44. Sees F’s Anatomy as the “grand culmination of myth criticism,” yet it is also a work that “maintained a seemingly impervious position as influential masterpiece” even after the decline of myth criticism in the 1960s. Notes that for all his synoptic inclusiveness F does privilege both myth (in his theory of modes) and archetypal criticism (in his theory of symbols). Finds that in F’s later work the autonomous view of criticism is tempered by his insisting that the end of criticism is ethical and participating.

L651. Lentricchia, Frank. “Frank Lentricchia” [interview with Imre Salusinszky]. Criticism in Society by Imre Salusinszky. New York: Methuen, 1987. 177-206 [185-86]. Says that in After the New Criticism he “tried to point up the structuralist and poststructuralist moment already in Frye” and expresses concern that the critical avant-garde has either forgotten F’s work or pretended that it didn’t exist.


L657. Martin, Wallace. Recent Theories of Narrative. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1986. 21-26, 31-42. Reviews F’s contribution to (1) theories of narrative (the Anatomy contains “the first noteworthy challenge” to the critical tradition of the early twentieth century, which opposed form to content and subjectivity to objectivity) and (2) kinds of narrative (his taxonomy of modes in the first essay of the Anatomy and his analysis of prose fiction in the fourth). Considers the ways Robert Scholes and Robert Kellogg expanded upon F’s theories.

L658. Mellard, James M. Doing Tropology: Analysis of Narrative Discourse. Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1987. 91-97. Uses F’s narrative archetypes and Hayden White’s tropological modes to illustrate that Faulkner’s Absolom, Absolom! “rather precisely mimes the progress of understanding as it moves tropologically from metaphor to irony and in emplotments from romance to irony-satire.”


L662. Miller, J. Hillis. “J. Hillis Miller” [interview with Imre Salusinszky]. *Criticism in Society* by Imre Salusinszky. New York: Methuen, 1987. 209-240 [238-40]. Believes that Salusinszky’s interviews, of which Miller’s is the final one, place too much emphasis on Frye’s importance in American criticism. “I like Frye as a practical critic, but the grand synthetic stuff, in the *Anatomy of Criticism*, is something I’ve never been able to read.” Says that he resisted F because he “needed to make space for something else.”


L667. Parker, Patricia. “What’s a Meta-Phor?” Paper presented at the 1987 convention of the Modern Language Association, San Francisco, 28 Dec. Compares F’s conception of metaphorical identity (“A is B”) with de Man’s post-Nietzschean wariness about such identifications. Examines their common debt to Mallarmé, but also notes the diverging directions in the formalist tradition the two critics have taken regarding Mallarmé’s poetry. Argues that F’s view of metaphorical identity as “hypothetical” retains a temporal, dynamic, and revolutionary element that extends the vision of the function of metacriticism and the role of the critic in society.


L678. Salusinszky, Imre. Criticism in Society. New York: Methuen, 1987. 27-30. Introduction to Salusinszky’s interview with F (G60). Discusses the ways Anatomy of Criticism “slaughters a veritable herd of New-Critical sacred cows” and glances at the three directions F’s work has moved since the Anatomy: studies of individual writers, social analysis, and literary criticism of the Bible. Sees F’s influence in his having inspired “a new surge of Romantic studies so powerful we are only now beginning to see the countermovement” and in his being “one of the great forces behind the establishment of the field now called ‘critical theory’.”

L679. __________. “Frye and Romanticism.” Paper presented at the 1987 convention of the Modern Language Association, San Francisco, 28 Dec. Typescript. 9 pp. Says the proper context of F’s work is the history of Romanticism. F is most neo-Romantic in his theory that the imagination does not simply reproduce but creates and in his extending the powers of prophecy from the poet to the critic. F managed to circumvent the -isms of the Cold War era when writing the Anatomy because he was able to see that the artistic effort itself overcomes the corruption out of which even great works arise. This recognition has the force of prophecy in today’s critical wars; thus, the Anatomy “has waited until its thirtieth birthday before assuming its full ministry.”


L681. Schwartz, Regina M. “Joseph’s Bones and the Resurrection of the Text: Remembering the Bible.” PMLA 103 (Mar. 1988): 114-24 [115-16]. Summarizes F’s typological reading of the Bible (a movement from promise to fulfillment) against which is placed an alternative reading (a movement of forgetting and remembering).

L682. Siebers, Tobin. The Ethics of Criticism. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1988. 35-37. Quarrels with F’s view of ethical criticism in the Anatomy because of its “implication that judgment by definition cannot be ethical.” Thinks that F wants to separate literature from the world and to define freedom apart from social existence.

L683. Spriet, P. “Frye et la theorie des genres.” Théorie des genres et communication, ed. Jean-Claude Barat, Pierre Orecchioni, and Alain Richard. Talence: Maison des sciences de l’homme, 1978. 43-68. Looks at F’s theory of genres from a linguistic perspective. Argues that only an archetypal approach can account for the themes, models, patterns, and images of literary works because such an approach sees genres as a “structure of social communication” between the speaker and the audience.

L684. Staines, David. “Northrop Frye in a Canadian Context.” Paper presented at the 1987 convention of the Modern Language Association, San Francisco, 28 Dec. Typescript. 10 pp. Sketches the development of F’s specifically Canadian criticism against the larger development of English Canadian literature. This criticism (more than eighty titles) deserves a special place in the F canon. It articulates such central Canadian myths as the garrison mentality, the swallowing leviathan, and
the peaceable kingdom. “The first Canadian writer whose vision is greater in kind than that of his best readers is Northrop Frye.”

L.685. States, Bert O. “Northrop Frye and the Anatomy of Wit.” Forthcoming in Hudson Review. Examines the foundations of the creative appeal in F’s work. F “has reversed the process of exemplification” by inscribing the general, invisible proposition in the visible, particular example. The role of the proposition is to support the particular, rather than the reverse, which usually characterizes discursive prose. Because F’s writing repatterns other literature, it produces an aesthetic response like that of a “great inverted poem.” Points to the features in F’s prose that produce the delight: its metaphorical surprises, its reliance on the techniques of ut pictura poesis, the counterpoint produced by its Rabelaisian voice, and its giving to literature a voice that literature does not have. Like a Breugel painting, Anatomy of Criticism does not use detail to fill in the structure of its schema; rather, the structure “is there to provide a context, if not an excuse, for the detail.” F’s criticism is not so much propositions that are confirmed by his piling detail upon detail. It is rather “the mimetic act of exemplification” itself.


L.689. Thomas, Brook. “The New Historicism and the Privileging of Literature.” Annals of Scholarship 4 (Summer 1987): 23-48. Draws on F’s discussion of the distinctions between literary and nonliterary discourse in the Anatomy, pointing out that although F claims all discourse is rhetorical and therefore literary, “this does not mean that there is no such thing as literature.” Looks at the critique of F by Terry Eagleton, maintaining that Eagleton’s view is a caricature and observing that both critics advocate the transforming power of literature. Finds Fredric Jameson’s “reading through Frye” to be a much better way of transforming F’s ethical view of literature into a politically sensitive criticism.

L.690. Todorov, Tzvetan. “Knowledge and Concern: Northrop Frye.” Literature and Its Theorists: A Personal View of Twentieth-Century Criticism. Trans. Catherine Porter. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1987. 89-105. Examines the difference between “what stems from the Romantic heritage in Frye’s thought and what transcends that traditional conceptual framework.” Contrasts F with the French structuralists (he is more interested in substance; they, in form; he writes an encyclopedia; they, a dictionary). Points to a number of opposing emphases in F’s work: the autonomy of literature vs. its relation to other things, nature vs. culture, freedom vs. concern, mythology vs. science. Believes that F hesitates on the issue of how criticism is precisely situated between these oppositions, that his popularizing style sometimes lacks rigor, and that this works are overly repetitive. Still, F’s reconciliatory view of criticism as dialogue and free reflection is produced by “a mind endowed with the rare quality of nobility.”

L692. __________. “Literature, between History and Ideology.” Paper presented at the 1987 annual meeting of the Midwest Modern Language Association, Columbus, Ohio. 9 pp. Typescript. Uses F’s theories of modes and symbols to interpret one of the vignettes from Juan Ramón Jiménez’s Platero y yo.


L697. West, Robin. “Jurisprudence as Narrative: An Aesthetic Analysis of Modern Legal Theory.” New York University Law Review 60 (May 1985): 145-211. Draws upon F’s Anatomy to argue that legal theory can be read as a form of narrative. ‘Part I of this Article summarizes Northrop Frye’s analysis of the role of myth in narrative and reviews his four ‘core myths’ and their corresponding literary plots: romance, irony, comedy, and tragedy. Part II describes four corresponding jurisprudential traditions: natural law, legal positivism, liberalism, and statism. Parts III and IV argue that each of these jurisprudential traditions is unified by either a vision of the world or a narrative method that corresponds to one of Frye’s four literary myths. The final section assesses the significance of this correspondence, demonstrating that it is fruitful to address conflicts in legal theory as reflecting aesthetic as well as political and moral differences in the way we view the world.’

L698. White, Hayden. “Ideology and Counterideology in the Anatomy.” Paper presented at the 1987 convention of the Modern Language Association, San Francisco, 28 Dec. Typescript. 18 pp. Against those who claim that the Anatomy is ideologically impure because it is ahistorical (e.g., Eagleton, Lentricchia, and Jameson), White argues that F’s understanding of modes serves as the counterideological foundation of the entire book. Maintains that by linking historical criticism with a theory of modes F moves beyond the categories of quantity, quality, and relation—categories that have characterized positivist views of history. F’s understanding of history, rather, is rooted in an awareness, similar to Kant’s, that modal relationships are those of possibility-impossibility, existence-nonexistence, and necessity-contingency. Thus, F understands that history “is graspable as history only insofar as it appears as a system in process of change”; and only the notion of modality can do justice to both the data of history and our understanding of those data. Because F insists that modality is the ultimate goal of a specifically historical understanding of history, he is able to see history as a system undergoing constant changes in both its form and its contents.

L699. White, R.S. “Criticism of the Comedies up to The Merchant of Venice.” Shakespeare Survey 37 (1984): 2-3. Says about F’s criticism of Shakespeare in “The Argument of Comedy,” A Natural Perspective, and Anatomy of Criticism: “Although one might now feel impatient with the sweeping range of his generalization, Frye remains seminal because he established two basic positions: comedy, romance, and tragedy all have intimate and formal visionary links with each other, and comedy can be every bit as serious as tragedy. Without somebody saying these things, the study of
Shakespearian comedy could have remained these thirty years in the domain of charming, weightless belles-lettres.”

Wilde, Alan. *Horizons of Assent: Modernism, Postmodernism, and the Ironic Imagination*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1981; rpt. with a new preface, Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1987. 5-6. Provides a brief overview of F’s (and Hayden White’s) ideas about irony, which are said accurately to describe much of contemporary irony. Develops his own position, however, in opposition to Frye and White’s cyclical theories because he finds them unable “to recognize the potential for affirmation within even the most self-conscious of ironies.”

M. Reviews

**M1. ANATOMY OF CRITICISM**


M1.82 Brooks, Cleanth. *Christian Scholar* 41 (June 1958): 169-73. 2400 words. Has reservations about F’s ideas on value judgments (“the ultimate difficulty of archetypal criticism is that it cannot tell us the difference between a good work and a bad”), but finds that the *Anatomy* “is indeed a remarkable book. The author’s incidental critical judgments...are frequently brilliant. He is not merely a system builder but a critic of real power...And the system itself, considered simply as an intellectual feat—a critical tour de force—is astonishing.”


**M7. FABLES OF IDENTITY**


**M8. FEARFUL SYMMETRY**


**M9. FOOLS OF TIME**


**M10. THE GREAT CODE**


M10.144 Mehnert, Gottfried. Literatur in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 18 (1985): 80-2. 1350 words. Gives a fairly detailed summary of the book’s argument. Says that F offers both a broad and deep framework for studying the Bible and that he shows the relevance that the Bible held and still holds for literature. “For literary criticism and for teaching Frye’s books it cannot be overlooked.”


M10.146 Payne, Michael. “Recent Studies in Biblical Literature.” Papers on Language and Literature 23 (Winter 1987): 89-103 [89-90]. Says that F “has provided the most comprehensive literary theory of the Bible yet published . . . . a standard against which more recent studies [such as those by Sternberg and Alter] can be judged.”


M10.151 Summerlin, Charles T. “Cracking the Code: A Review of Northrop Frye’s *The Great Code*.” Lamar Journal of the Humanities 18 (1985): 52-55. 1500 words. Believes that nothing in *GC* “is more critical than the phases of language Frye, drawing on Vico, posits in his first chapter.” Notes that F is not always able to maintain the separation between literary criticism and theology; religious ideals, in any event, show through his commentary.


M11. THE MODERN CENTURY


M12. THE MYTH OF DELIVERANCE

See M9.26 and M9.27 above. The Italian trans. of The Myth of Deliverance was published with Fools of Time.


M12.18 Wheeler, Richard P. Studies in English Literature 24 (Spring 1984): 373-406 [378-80]. 740 words. Summarizes the book’s argument about reversal in three of Shakespeare’s romantic comedies. Thinks F’s treatment is illuminating, especially when he relates Shakespeare to the literary tradition, but is not convinced that F has squarely addressed the problematic nature of the “problem comedies.”

M14. NORTHROP FRYE ON SHAKESPEARE


M14.24 Craik, T.W. Durham University Journal 80 (Dec. 1987): 145-47 [146-47]. 500 words. Remarks that the style of F’s lectures is clear and brisk. “Frye manages to address what is probably a mixed-ability audience in such a way as to provide something that everyone can take in. In this, though in a very different medium, he has something in common with Shakespeare himself.”


M14.26 Edwards, Karen L. “Stages of Understanding: Frye’s Lectures on Shakespeare.” Kenyon Review, n.s., 9 (Spring 1987): 122-25. 1330 words. Believes that F’s lectures “demonstrate that it is possible for a scholar to shape rich and complex readings to the demands of the lecture hall . . . [T]he lectures are at once an admirably clear introduction to and a sophisticated study of Shakespeare’s plays.” Wishes F had devoted more attention to the question of performance. Notes that F is ultimately interested in what happens after the dramatic action in Shakespeare has concluded.

M14.27 Kernan, Alvin. “Criticism as Theodicy: The Institutional Role of Literary Criticism.” Yale Review 77 (1986): 86-102 [93-94]. In an omnibus review of books on Renaissance literature, primarily Shakespearean, remarks that F’s lectures are interesting, though not remarkable, and that the book “sounds like a valedictory nostalgia for older ways and simpler things.”


M14.29 Summers, Joseph H. Shakespeare Quarterly 38 (1987): 534-37. 1800 words. Asks whether there is any reason for the readers of Shakespeare Quarterly to read lectures F delivered to undergraduates. Answers yes, “because Frye in almost any form can hardly keep from being provocative, challenging, illuminating.” Summers quotes extensively from the book, disagreeing with some of F’s readings. Thinks that the last three chapters—on Measure for Measure, The Winter’s Tale, and The Tempest—are the strongest.

M20. THE STUBBORN STRUCTURE


M22. THE WELL-TEMPERED CRITIC


N. Dissertations


P. Miscellaneous

P173 Anon. “Northrop Frye Center Initiated.” Vic Report 16 (Spring 1988): 3. News story about the establishment in April 1988 of the Northrop Frye Centre of Victoria University, which will focus on “fields of academic endeavor that are akin to the thought and writings” of F and will support “projects capable of making excellent contributions to research in the human sciences.”
P175 __________. “Northrop Frye Wins Top Literary Award.” University of Toronto Magazine Summer 1987: 29. On F’s receiving the Governor-General’s Award.


P187 Harris, Robin S. *English Studies at Toronto: A History*. Toronto: Governing Council, Univ. of Toronto, 1988. Includes scattered references to F’s role in the English department at the University of Toronto. See especially chapters 6 and 7. The PhD theses supervised by F (and others) are listed in Appendix 2a.

P188 Hay, John A. “Editorial Note.” *AUMLA* 66 (Nov. 1986): 151. An introduction to the “Special Northrop Frye Number” of AUMLA, commemorating F’s visit to Australia and New Zealand in 1986. Several of the articles in the special number come from a seminar held in F’s honor at the Australian National University.

P189 Howard, Maureen. *Facts of Life*. Boston, Little, Brown, 1978. 78. From a section of her autobiography, entitled “Dining Out”: “I remember a lunch served up in the back bedroom of a second-story faculty flat in Ohio to Northrop Frye, the literary critic, our visiting dignitary at Kenyon College. . . . I sat at the head of the table, a veritable Madame de Sévigné of central Ohio, exhausted by my labors. I cannot remember one word the great man said, yet getting up from the table I knew that I would dine out on having had him for lunch. I will not bore you with the menu which I do remember down to the last braised turnip in the grande marmite. I was charming too, always that, and knew what to ask, had ‘read up on,’ if not read his book on Blake. Myopic and proper, bending into his soup, he talked as though we wanted really to say something. I got the impression of a generous man, so committed to his work that he could not fathom my triviality.”

P190 Kahan, Marcia. “Pillow Talk.” *Books in Canada* 14 (April 1985): 3-4. Reports on a debate between Frank Kermode and Terry Eagleton about the academic study of literature. “About the only subject on which they could agree was Frye’s obsolescence.”


P197 Steele, Charles R. “Canada.” Year’s Work in English Studies 64 (1983): 561. Comments briefly on a symposium devoted to The Great Code. Summarizes the four papers, which were subsequently published in the University of Toronto Quarterly (see L265).


Superlatives

The Briefest Review of Anatomy of Criticism

In her column “Fireside Gardening” in the Augusta Chronicle [Georgia] (26 November 1967), Florence Hill Morris, after advising her readers to “pore through books on the subject” of foliage and flower arrangement, proceeds to annotate a list of such books. Included among them is Anatomy of Criticism [], the complete annotation for which is as follows: “A difficult book to read, but with study the material is most helpful.”

Harold Bloom on Frye

“In terms of my own theorizations, one would have to say that one’s attempt to find precursors here and there merely evades the truth, which is that the precursor proper has to be Northrop Frye. I purchased and read Fearful Symmetry a week or two after it had come out. . . . It ravished my heart away. I thought it was the best book I had ever read about anything. I must have read it a hundred times between 1947 and 1950, probably intuitively memorized it, and will never escape the effect of it. . . . To compare lesser things with greater, my relation to Frye’s criticism is Pater’s relation to Ruskin’s criticism, or Shelley’s relation to Wordsworth’s poetry: the authentic precursor, no matter how one tries to veil it or conceal it both from oneself and from others.

Frye is surely the major literary critic in the English language. Now that I am mature and willing to face my indebtedness, Northrop Frye does seem to me . . . a kind of Miltonic figure. He is certainly the largest and most crucial figure in the English language since the divine Walter and the divine Oscar: he really is that good. I have tried to find an alternative father in Mr. Burke, who is a charming fellow and a very powerful critic, but I don’t come from Burke: I come out of Frye.” — Harold Bloom in Criticism in Society, a series of interviews with contemporary critics by Imre Salusinszky (New York: Methuen, 1987), p. 62.
Making Literature out of Frye

As Frye frequently reminds us, literature is made out of other literature. But literature is also made out of criticism, and Frye himself has entered into the poems, plays, and novels of our own time frequently enough to provide some tenure-anxious assistant professor enough grist to turn out a small monograph. One of the central characters of David Lodge’s Changing Places, for example, refers humorously to the perpetual motion of an elevator, “a profoundly poetic machine,” as symbolizing Frye’s theory of modes in Anatomy of Criticism (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1975; Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978, pp. 212-13). Here are further examples:

The following bit of dialogue occurs in Frederic Raphael’s play, “Oxbridge Blues,” from Oxbridge Blues and Other Plays for Television (London: BBC, 1984). Victor is a serious writer. Wendy is his wife:

“Victor: I didn’t think you felt like discussing it.
Wendy: I don’t even know what ‘it’ is. What is it? I know you’re ridiculously jealous of Pip and you can’t even bring yourself to accept his generosity without looking as though you’d much sooner be reading the collected works of — of — of — oh — Northrop Frye.
Victor: I would. Much. The Anatomy of Criticism, though flawed, was a seminal work in some ways. Why did you happen to choose that name?
Wendy: I wanted someone with a silly name.
Victor: I don’t find Northrop particular silly.
Wendy: Well I do. I find it very silly indeed. Not as silly as you’re being, but still very silly. . . .”

From Roger Angell’s “Greetings, Friends” in the New Yorker, 29 December 1980, p. 35:

“Come on, everyone and Northrop Frye,
Sing ‘Angels We Have Heard on High’
For Famous Amos, Richard Leakey,
The Andersons—Cat, John, and Keke—
Dennis Conner and the Freedom’s crew,
Greenpeace, and Roche & Dinkeloo!”

From Gail Godwin’s The Odd Woman (New York: Knopf, 1974), pp. 257-58:

“Was Gabriel’s project quixotic? For almost two years, she had vacillated between thinking him a nearsighted fool and a farsighted genius. How could she tell? Surely there must be a way to measure it, but how? After the fact, it became a bit simpler. For instance, in the field of literature, of literary criticism, she knew Northrop Frye was a genius—even though some respectable scholars like Sonia Mark’s husband detested Northrop Frye. Frye’s ideas made sense; they rested on valuable hypotheses; they lit up the entire realm of literature for you. After you had read Frye, you thought of your favorite books as parts of a large family. You not only saw them as you had before, but you saw behind them and in front of them. It was like meeting someone, forming an opinion about this person, then being privileged to meet the person’s parents and grandparents, as well; and then being privileged to meet the person’s children, and grandchildren! Of course, someone like Max Covington would say, The person himself, alone, should be judged. What do parents have to do with it? What do his children have to do with it? They only confuse and diffuse you from the proper study of the object, which is: the object itself.
She had tried to lift her assurance about Frye—as one might gingerly try to lift an anchovy from its tin and place it, undamaged, on a plate—and transfer it toward her wavering confidence in Gabriel. Surely, during the forties and fifties when Frye was painstakingly filling his wife’s shoe boxes with notecards for *Anatomy of Criticism*, Mrs. Frye had had an occasional qualm. Or had she? After all, Frye had done *Fearful Symmetry* first. She had that to build on. She knew that her first closetful of shoeboxes had come to something. Whereas, with Gabriel, there was only the queer, eccentric little monograph, published half a lifetime ago!”


“For a day at the [MLA] convention, Jack Emory had wandered aimlessly through exhibits, mainly to glance furtively and with secret pride at the display of which his own book was a part. A study of the poets of the nineties, it represented the salvageable matter from what he now saw was a verbose, huge, disorganized doctoral dissertation. Out of idle curiosity on the first evening he had attended a meeting or two. He had heard the distinguished medieval scholar Kemp Malone speaking on ‘Chaucer’s Double Consonants and the Final e,’ sticking it out mainly because he had studied under a man who was always mentioning Kemp Malone. The lady professor from Vassar who followed with a fifteen-minute talk about some aspect of Chaucer sent him, however, in flight to another room. There Northrop Frye, definitely an in figure, was discoursing on Finnegans Wake. Following this, his head full of quests and cycles, of mythic patterns and archetypes, and it being 11:30, he went to bed, only to dream a conversation with William Blake on the subject of Charles II.”


“In any disinterested evaluative scale of American colleges, Benedict Arnold hardly ranks tops; to [Ralph Zugsmith] Coolidge [president of Benedict Arnold College] it was more scholarly than Harvard, better built than Yale, more socially attractive than Princeton, and with better parking facilities than all of them. The student body, as it teemed about campus—very much body, the girls in their shorts, the boys in theirs—he saw from his window as young America, the best of all possible young Americans. No possible evidence of ignorance or of vice could disillusion him. Responsibility to them and to the world weighed on his head, like an over-large hat. He was totally serious; he groaned in the night; he cared and worried. He ran advertisements in the quality monthlies: ‘For the future! A B.A. from B.A.’ He shivered when Harvard got Reisman or Toronto Frye, shivered because he saw a prospective Benedict Arnold man drawn off into false paths.”

From Robertson Davies’s “The Pit Whence Ye Are Digged” in *High Spirits* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983), describing the talk at the High Table among the Senior Fellows of the “College”:

“The noise of conversation was high. Two notable divines, The Reverend John Evans and The Reverend Northrop Frye, were hard at it; Dr. Evans defending the doctrine of salvation through works—the works one could grind out of others—while Dr. Frye was urging salvation through the refiner’s fire of an exacting criticism of Holy Writ.”

From *Cerberus: Poems* by Louis Dudek, Irving Layton, and Raymond Souster (Toronto: Contact Press, 1952), p. 55. The following verse is Layton’s “The Excessively Quiet Groves”: 
“I said: Mr Butchevo Phrye / Make no mistake, / I’m the reincarnation / Of William Blake. / But alas: Mr. Butchevo Phrye / was born to pry / Among old bones / And cemetery stones.”

Metaphorical Manna

“On the 17th Sunday of the year, Cycle 2, I preached, more or less extempore, on the connection between the first and third readings, respectively the story of Elisha multiplying some loves and of Jesus feeding the 5,000. To try to help the congregation bring the right frame of mind to reading the Bible I pointed out the typological connection; how behind both stories was the story of the manna in the desert, and how feeding with food is a regular biblical metaphor (or metonym—words I did not use in the sermon) for teaching the word of God. After Mass a great friend of mine said, ‘I disagreed with your sermon. It does matter whether things actually happened or not.’ I protested that I had not said it didn’t. And then she said that during the sermon her husband had whispered to her ‘Northrop Frye.’” —Edmund Hill, O.P., in *Blackfriars* 64 (February 1983): 92.

Frygian Tropes from Here and There

“Some of you may have acquired no better vision of society than the bridge table, which, like the City of God, requires four squares. Some of you may have achieved your social vision involuntarily, and with your minds on something else, like the girl who picked up a book called How to Hug, and who found when she got home that she had bought a copy of the thirteenth volume on an encyclopedia.”

—NF, “Convocation Address, Queen’s University, May 18, 1962.” Unpublished ms [I17].

“There were no plays where I grew up. . .what films penetrated to my town were only bad novels photographed; radio was beginning, but still sounded rather as most electronic music sounds to me now: like an evil spirit trying to get born and not succeeding.”

—NF, “Literature and Society.” Unpublished ms [I32].

“Metaphor was made for man and not man for metaphor; or, as my late and much beloved colleague Marshall McLuhan used to say, Man’s reach should exceed his grasp, or what’s a metaphor?”

—NF, “The Double Mirror” [D268].

“To develop sympathy with the aims of scholarship without being a scholar is like learning to swim by correspondence: it can be done, but is more practicable to get soaked first.”

—NF, “Address at the Installation of Alvin Lee, November 14, 1980.” Unpublished ms [I135].

“My own graduation took place in the depression, where we were trying to find our places in a society where nobody wanted us. Then for six interminable years the shadow of war fell over the University as it fell over everything else, and now we find ourselves eyeing the world itself apprehensively, like a bride with a new stove, uncertain whether it will blow up in her face or merely cook her goose.”

—NF, “Convocation Address, Queen’s University, May 18, 1962.” Unpublished ms [I17].

“The news media talk so much about hippies that we begin to wonder if we are not moving from a Roundhead culture to a Cavalier one, from a society dominated by suburban matrons and junior executives and cocktail parties to a society dominated by flower children in city ghettos and pot sessions, where the acid head has replaced the ulcerated stomach as a status symbol.”

—NF, “The University and the Heroic Vision” [D183].
“In an age of science fiction Ezekiel’s vision of a chariot of ‘wheels within wheels’ seems more relevant if what he saw was a spaceship from another planet; and an age of drug cults and popular occultism feels attracted by the notion that Jesus and his disciples were devotees of the agaric mushroom, or that Moses produced such miracles as bringing water out of rock through his training in Egyptian magic, which would naturally have included dowsing. I am not dismissing such explanations: one should doubtless keep an open mind about them, though an open mind, to be sure, should be open at both ends, like the food pipe, and have a capacity for excretion as well as intake.” —NF, The Great Code [A19].

“The only value-judgment which is consistently and invariably useful to the scholarly critic is the judgment that his own writings, like the morals of a whore, are no better than they should be.” —NF, “On Value Judgements” [D173].

“[The coffee-table book] is normally a collection of photographs or pictures or buildings, and is designed, not to stand on shelves with an army of unalterable law, but to lie down enticingly and alone, like a mistress.” —NF, “The Renaissance of Books” [D219].

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