Northrop Frye Newsletter

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Frye began this notebook shortly before Anatomy of Criticism was completed and continued to write in it until 1962 or 1963.¹ Throughout the notebook, Frye uses a symbolic code (e.g., L, inverted V, sideways T) to refer to the various writing projects that he conceived early on as a way of structuring his life’s work, calling this conceptual scheme his ogdoad. The eight projects were named Liberal, Tragicomedy, Anticlimax, Rencontre, Mirage, Paradox, Ignoramus, and Twilight. In the text of the present notebook, I have replaced the symbolic codes by their names. All other editorial changes are in square brackets. For a full explanation of the ogdoad, see Michael Dolzani, “The Book of the Dead: A Skeleton Key to Northrop Frye’s Notebooks,” in Rereading Frye: The Published and Unpublished Works, ed. David Boyd and Imre Salusinszky (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 18–38. The present notebook will appear at a later date in Northrop Frye’s Notebooks for “Anatomy of Criticism.”

[1] In the course of the slow & cumbersome regrouping of my ideas around mythoi instead of genres, an agenda has gradually formed itself once more, in the familiar pattern, one more book having to be numbered zero. Now, my first study looks like a comparative study of myth, one pole the Bible & the other the thematic content of lyric (Yeats, Stevens, etc.). Tentative title: “A Primer of Typology.” My articles on Yeats & Paradise Regained point in this direction.²

[2] The second one is a straight “Morphology of Fiction,” the main part of it an analysis of romance. All my interests in Morris, Hawthorne, Spenser, Poe & the like converge here. The third starts a new line of investigation along the conception of metaphor as constructive element in conceptual thinking. Here all my relatively new hunches about controlling metaphors, models & the like, will go. Finally will come an expansion of metaphor & model into a restatement of myth, this time as a crystallization of all “thought,” in a contemporary context.

[3] Here I should like to collect skeleton or master keys, ideas that, although they may be explicitly expressed only in one book, in some measure run through all. Most such ideas are of course already in Structural Poetics. This is for new ones.

[4] SP [Structural Poetics, i.e., Anatomy of Criticism] left the suggestion that there were at least two mental structures: the verbal universe and the numerical, quantitative, or mathematical universe.³ Now numbers, although they run in a sequence, seem to have a peculiar relation to space: whenever mathematics deals with time it translates it into a spatial dimension. Ever since my undergraduate grapplings with Spengler & Bergson I’ve been told that durée, time as inward experience, was something other than this physical translation of it.

[5] It seems possible that verbal structures, as their intimate connexion with emotion & values might suggest, are in fact projections of time, which is therefore not incommunicable or inconceivable, as we’re so often told, but on the contrary the source of all power of articulation. God said let there be light and there was light: the shaping of the thing by the word is the entry of divinity into time. Hence verbal expression in its most highly disciplined, disinterested and concentrated form, which is poetry, becomes rhythmical.
But there appear to be two forms of experiencing time. One is the entropy clock, the sense of an irreversible movement toward the increasingly predictable. The other is teleological time, in which the effect always precedes the cause, the cause being final. Here is also the evolutionary rhythm, consciousness following on & eventually mastering existence, “mind” doing the same to “matter,” and human work, the building of the city & the garden, demonstrating the real form of human life. Hence Wiener's notion that communication, the use in short of the word, overcomes entropy.

It seems to me that the verbal structures produced by entropy time are the assertive structures based on an externally conceived ontological postulate. That is, they are based on the conception of substance, and, as we can clearly see in Spinoza, they tend to approximate & imitate mathematical structures. Those produced by teleological time are the hypothetical ones based on metaphor, or inner identification. For all metaphor starts in the man-and-boy metaphor: the identity of the inner life:

I suppose there is also an “entropy space,” which is mechanical, & a teleological space which is mathematical. Or maybe I can just work it out as a contrast between space-oriented time & time as the growth of energy.

A lot of my similar opposites would fit this: memory & habit or practice-memory; association & thought, etc. I wonder how far one could get taking some philosopher to be totally wrong, as Ramus is reputed to have done with Aristotle. Blake & some other romantics did it with Locke; a lot of people have unconsciously done it with Hobbes; Ryle & others do it with Descartes; my present (and doubtless soon passing) phase seems to be doing it with Spinoza.

I think of either Liberal or Tragicomedy as concerned partly with topoi, including such ones of my own discovery as the light & dark female, the red & white life & death one, and so on. And of Anticlimax as concerned not only with a categorization of metaphors, but with some attempt to relate this to rhetorical devices.

Engineering metaphors or thought models start of course with fire and the wheel. One gives metaphors of spark, scintilla, energy & the like: most of our organism metaphors take off from it. The wheel is of course the source of all cyclical conceptions of fate, fortune & nature. The pendulum is involved in all Yin & Yang theories like those in Plato’s Politicus; it’s also part of Hegel. But in Hegel, as still more in Marx, we begin to get all the “feedback,” “governor” & other self-regulating metaphors that run through 19th c. thought from Burke to Butler.

Internal combustion is in anima mundi & all vitalist metaphors; ball bearings, in myths of individuality; gears in metaphors of compulsion & interaction, & so on. Organism metaphors, as in Spengler, may be reducible to mechanisms.

Geometrical metaphors come mainly from the spatial orientation of the body. Ladders, staircases, chains of being & pyramidal hierarchies of steps are all “up lifting” thoughts: divers & miners suggest profundity, depth, & the resurrection of gold & pearls from the dead. “On the other hand,” we have metaphors of parallelism, balance & dual symmetry. Church, army & feudal system are degree-models; metaphors of discontinuity come into the absolute monarch, Providence, & the Cartesian soul.

So far everything’s a loose bundle to me. Anticlimax or Rencontre will be concerned with the role of aesthetic judgement in morals: i.e. the number of moral judgements we make that are actually aesthetic ones, chiefly of taste and timing. Also, of course, the use of political leaders as dramatis personae: Eisenhower & Stevenson as the plain man & egghead of low-norm satire; Jimmy Walker as gay blade; Lindbergh as solar hero.

Then there’s the whole business of the psychic imitation of the physical. The clergyman is a spiritual “healer”; the psychiatrist is up to his chin in metaphorical medicine: psychic equivalents of embolisms ("blocks") & the like.
Arnold’s “marriage with deceased wife’s sister” is a case of secular sacramentalism: the ersatz or substitute act of vision. Then there’s the scansion-and-action pattern that comes into Darwin: a holding together of a total potential following by dialectic choice, or movement. This is linked somehow with the figure of the vortex or narrowing cone, as in Dante. It’s in the conditioned-reflex trial & error pattern too. At present the sensible thing to do would be to read criticism and sources of typology, in preparation for the Harvard courses. The notes thus collected would become either notes to SP [Structural Poetics] or a separate book, depending on whether SP stays as one or vanishes into another zero (Liberal or pre-Liberal).

After that, Tragicomedy is clearer: a morphology of fiction starting with (myth)-romance, & going on to mimetic & ironic displacements. It’ll take my scattered notes on Great Expectations, Humphry Clinker, The Egoist, Handley Cross, Joyce’s The Dead, as well as my Spenser & Morris & Hawthorne hunches.

Then Anticlimax could be either or both of two things: a study of metaphor & concept, as above, or a morphology of imagery, focussed on the modern lyric (Yeats, Valéry, Maeterlinck, Rilke, Stevens, etc.). Presumably the one that isn’t Anticlimax will be Rencontre, but I dunno: one of them has my 4k ideas in it. I don’t want to start floundering around in tables of contents again, though. If I’d just think of four books as four simultaneous Zoas it might help.

Anyway, I ought to start with Blake’s distinction between the world man makes & the world he lives in, the worlds of innocence & experience, as aligned with the Copernicus-Newton tradition of a hidden world of primary qualities. Both are constructs, poetic & mathematical. (Note for Milton article: this is the agon of Palamabron & Satan as it affects Milton.)

One has to distinguish a metaphor from the verbal construct embodying it, the picture from the frame. If I say “X has got a bee in his bonnet about Y,” I am using metaphor. If I say “X has got the notion Y into his head,” I am using the same verbal construct. It is only a construct, but adequate for its purposes & unlikely to lead to misunderstanding, hence “correct.” One might try to compile a list of essential constructs, but I doubt if they would be more than pragmatically essential. The metaphor then is a dramatized construct, an implicit identification made explicit.

All literature is literally ironic, which is why humor is so close to the hypothetical. If you don’t mean what you say, you’re either joking or poetizing.

I have a notion that a prolonged period of solitude & fasting would produce hallucinations, & that these would be mandalas and such: they would be the essential forms in which “outer” perceptions are organized. Now that I’ve got this down, it’s rather a platitude—as well as a principle already applied to literature in Maud Bodkin’s book—but still, as Freud says, it’s one thing to know & another to realize. I just wonder if my “hypothesis” idea isn’t the introverted or formalizing core of the representing disciplines.

I must expand the conception of dandyism as, essentially, a comic literary convention entering life around the second half of the 19th c. The dandy develops out of the Cléante type of comic moral norm, detached from what is seen as a crowd of preoccupied attached obsessed people, all facing in the same direction. The dandy is essentially conservative, because the facing-one-direction people make an assumption of progress, yet his impact is that of a devil’s advocate, reversing the melodramatic maxims in which society believes. Apart from the French developments, Oscar Wilde popularized the attitude, the progenitor of which in England is really Matthew Arnold, both in his life & in his comedies. An Ideal Husband has the dandy in one of his proper roles—that of gracioso-hero. His attitude is comic-existential, puncturing the balloons of false idealism. A Woman of No Importance has a far more brilliant dandy, but
Wilde, partly through an effort to be “fair” to the other side, partly through a streak of masochism, & partly through sheer laziness, completely foozled the conclusion. Anyway, the dandy attitude survives in the early (twenties) essays of Aldous Huxley, whose epigrams are mainly inverted clichés, in Yeats’ association of dandyism & heroism, in Lytton Strachey, & in the contemporary New Yorker—see its Knickerbocker figure and again the inverted melodrama clichés of its cartoons. G.K. Chesterton is an anti-dandy; Shaw uses the dandy formula of course, but never puts much of himself behind it. I think something of this might get into an essay on Samuel Butler, who isn’t a dandy, but uses one as a norm in WAF [The Way of All Flesh], & is in marked contrast to William Morris, who’s a tough little Cockney drudge, to use Carlyle’s opposite term. Catholicism as an intellectual’s refuge has a lot to do with dandyism—Firbank, Waugh, etc. The sexual fantasies of the dandy are masochistic, partly because of the strong homosexual lean of dandyism. This has been there from its beginnings in chivalry & Courtly Love. Its patron saint is of course the Van Dyke portrait of Charles I. Most “longhairs” hanker for some kind of Jacobitism—in the U.S.A. it’s Confederacy. The remarkably skilful use of dandyism by Eliot is a study in itself, especially in his criticism. This is one of those instances in which life imitates literature.

[25] Of all mistakes founded on premature value-judgements & bad generic classification, one of the most inept is the attribution of creativity to the genre itself. Thus it is widely assumed that anyone who produces poems or fiction is “creative,” though he may never have written a creative line in his life, & that anyone who produces “non-fiction,” including criticism, is “non-creative,” though his verbal structures may be far profounder in their implications.

[26] The fallacy that the poet using discursive material is doing the same kind of job as the philosopher naturally leads to the conclusion that he must do it either worse or better. If worse, poetry is a watered-down popularization of philosophy; if better, philosophy is only the abstract residue of a creative energy properly expressed in poetry. Both views are popular & widely held; both are nonsense; both are obstacles to criticism.

[27] The present classification must be the right one, because it’s the one that’s been in front of me all the time, concealed by the book now called Anatomy of Criticism. Well, then, an interconnected tetralogy. The first volume (L Liberal) is still a study of epic, which I think of as divided into four main parts. The first part deals with the primary epic, evolving from the undisplaced mythos archetype of romance, through the in medias res discovery form of epic. It concentrates mainly on Homer, and (as I think now) ends with Virgil. Part Two deals with the Bible; Part Three with Dante. That’s three parts on the epic, scripture & sacramental epic or encyclopaedic poem respectively. Part Four deals with the archetypes of romance, as exemplified in Spenser. Minor questions: I don’t know how much Milton has to go in, but some subordinate themes such as pastoral from Theocritus to Lycidas certainly belong. So it is a book on Spenser after all, if he’s big enough to take it. And it fixes, more or less, my worries about how to get scripture, epic & romance all into the same book. I no longer think I have to write a hundred pages on every goddam epic ever written. The book is continuous, architectonic, & strongly Protestant in tone, less for theological reasons than because Spenser & Milton are the narrative climax.

[28] Then comes a study of drama (Tragicomedy), in which the romances of Shakespeare have a place corresponding to Spenser. It’s just barely possible that this will take the form of a review of my 24 phases, & called something like “The Well-Tempered Critic.” But at present I see it as my old morphology of drama scheme, with the same primary emphasis on romantic comedy it’s always had.

[29] There follows a study that starts with my 4k notes, expands from there through a study of prose Anticlimax into an analysis of the role of metaphor (diagram & ambiguities) in conceptual thought. What I used to call the Locke program of reading is its basis.
Then comes a resuming of the thread of the narrative of literary symbolism that the first book had, only it will be (Rencontre) fundamentally a study in fragmentation & epiphany, running from Blake to the Yeats-Joyce-Stevens generation. William Morris is the connecting link with the previous book. I see 3 & 4 as growing out of the fourth essay, & 1 & 2 out of the third.24

After that I may be ready to tackle a general study of aesthetics (Mirage which will recapture a few fish that have got away. After that I'll retire and devote myself to Paradox & Ignoramus, & perhaps a book of aphoristic Pensées for Twilight. I've written very little that I can use for any of this except notes: P.R. is all I have for Liberal; my Shakespeare stuff is for Tragicomedy; Blake, Yeats, Joyce & Stevens fit Rencontre—I've done most on that—but there's no assemblage problem.

Aristotle seems to me unique among philosophers, not only in dealing specifically with poetics, but in assuming that such poetics would be an organon of a specific discipline. Other philosophers, when they touch on the arts, deal in questions of general aesthetics which they make a set of analogies to their logical & metaphysical views; hence it is difficult to use the aesthetics of, say, Kant or Hegel without getting involved in a Kantian or Hegelian “position,” which of course is the opposite of what I am here attempting to do.

Value-judgements are worn as blinders by conventional critics to prevent themselves from seeing the real facts of literature. Karl Shapiro in Indiana spoke of Jung’s references to Rider Haggard as showing what crude & undeveloped taste in literature Jung had. Maybe Jung’s taste is crude, but Shapiro’s real feeling was that once we start making serious allusions to “inferior” writers, the whole system of valuation which makes Shapiro an interesting & distinctive person will be overthrown.25

Closely connected with this is the bad analogy between reading and eating, which a lot of people have without knowing it. In eating a large amount of the involuntary & automatic goes on: a baby’s pablum builds up the baby’s nervous & muscular energy without consciousness being involved. Taking the analogy seriously gives us the theory of educational magic: the notion that one cannot help improving one’s mind by being exposed to Shakespeare or Dante. The negative side of this is the impulse behind censorship: the analogy of poison, the notion that certain arrangements of words will, like a mushroom full of prussic acid, automatically & involuntarily do harm. There is an educational rhythm to be followed, analogous to not giving beef-steak to babies; but knowledge, being conscious, is based on character, & has no automatism. To the true critic there is nothing poisonous, because poison, unlike food, works automatically in the mechanical, not the organic, sense. I haven’t got all this clear yet.

My five modes, as I say, are actually seven modes. The top one is existential enlightenment through the oral tradition, transmitted by people like Socrates, Pythagoras, most founders of religions, including Jesus & Buddha in their aspect as human teachers, the gurus of Yoga, bodhisattvas, & others of whom one feels that they do not write. The response to such teaching is the sacramental act. Twentieth-century examples would be Gurdjieff and (in part) Wittgenstein. The bottom one is demagoguery and jargon, & the response to it is the mob rite—lynchings, wars, parades & the like.

I can’t help wondering if there isn’t some analogy between my “anagogic” perspective & Kant’s conception of “transcendental aesthetic” as the consciousness of space & time.26 I feel unwilling though to introduce such analogies into what attempts to concern itself with the organon of a specific discipline.

In vision there is focussed vision & peripheral vision, visual awareness which is not really seeing, but which expresses itself in a kinesthetic sense of orientation. Much in the rational tradition is based on the analogy of vision: there is truth or reality on which we focus, a peripheral “posse.” I’ve just been reading a book in the yogi tradition: Ouspensky’s In Search of the Miraculous—which carries this analogy to the limit of completely eliminating the peripheral vision.
I wonder how far I could get on the hypothesis that my Eight Classics are not books that I write, but books that I read. In that case they wouldn’t be progressive or initiatory, but simultaneously present. I’m just wondering if my next upward heave isn’t into another “zero” book, that all my books are zeros. And that the next effort has its centre of gravity in Mirage, and is concerned with the formal principles of at least music, literature & painting.

That would considerably foreshorten my present scheme, which appears to be taking the form of a study of the formal principles of literature, thus: Part One, Myth, as the formal principle of narrative, applied to a) scripture b) romance c) epic d) mimetic fiction. Part Two, Mandala or Persona or something, having a good deal to do with The Tempest, as the formal principle of drama. Part Three, Model, as the formal principle of non-literary prose. Part Four, Metaphor, as the formal principle of lyric. Then a concluding part on analogous structural principles in the other arts (e.g. sculpture as the hypothesis of biology). And if it doesn’t work out just in that form, at least the principle of boiling down and taking a simultaneous view may be sound. That’s really all that’s new in this hunch.

When we say “perhaps idea B in X’s mind is not after all inconsistent with idea A,” what we mean is that it is possible to find a verbal formula that will connect them.

There are no heresies in the arts, only failures; and the eager heresy-hunting that poets & their disciples go in for tells us only about them. As soon, that is, as we see through the trick on which their writing is based: the illusion of raising one’s standards by limiting one’s sympathies.

The binary form in music (A tonic to dominant; B dominant to tonic) is really based on the mirror principle, as the stunt known as “rovescio” makes clear (in e.g. a Haydn minuet).

Well, well. Rossini had always been to me the type of the detached artist, who simply quit when he’d made enough to retire, instead of flogging his genius every inch of the way, like a true artist. Now I discover a humorous but oddly touching piano piece called “Marche et reminiscences pour mon dernier voyage.” It’s a funeral march, with a very curious second theme marked “frappons.” Then follows snatches of all his operas, from Tancred to William Tell, with the funeral march interpenetrating them. At the end the “knocking” theme returns, & as the piece resolves on its tonic there are the notes “on ouvre,” and finally “j’y suis,” then “Requiem.” Maybe Shakespeare, too, cared more than I’ve been assuming.

Ordinary social relationships are a mixture of sincerity & hypocrisy: sometimes we mean what we say, sometimes we speak ironically or hypothetically; but in any case personal sincerity switches on & off like an electric light. (One may be sincere in irony, as when a panegyrical obituary is felt to be “right,” though nobody regards it as more than an aesthetic conventionalizing of the truth.) Similarly in poetry or discursive writing: the relation of any given passage to personal sincerity is unpredictable. Clergymen, especially Protestant preachers, find it hard to adapt to this: they feel they’re hypocritical if they don’t believe they believe all they say. But nobody but a paranoid does send his personal current through every statement, just as nobody but a hopeless pedant or cynic believes nothing he says. You can’t go on being a hypocrite: that’s an illusory vice for the most part, & a prolific breeder of pharmakoi [scapegoats].

Consider the possibility of starting with a set of “keys,” a Tarot pack or alphabet of forms, arrived at inductively from a series of analyses, as in my myth course. The point of epiphany is one; the point of demonic epiphany another, & the cycle a third. Then there are nekyia complexes (monster-swallowing; cycle-projecting, etc.), unborn world complexes, & so on. The thing is that I mustn’t tackle another book without getting at least the Iliad, the Odyssey, the Aeneid & the Commedia firmly into my noodle.

The principle of Liberal appears to be theory of mythos, based, as above, on the possession of the central epic tradition. It’s apparently a study of the conjunctive principle of literary form. I’ve been dithering about attacking it through my myth course, because of feeling that lyrical analysis leads rather to Rencontre. But is apparently a study of what I’ve variously called commination, fragmentation, &
sparagmos: of the element common to the lyric as fragment and the anatomic satire; the ironic core. Anyway, the connecting principle of Liberal is still definitive myth, or scripture, & so the scripture-romance-epic sequence belongs, & the conception of displacement connects its dynamic aspect (mythos) with its static or patterned aspect (analogy).

[47] The principle of Tragicomedy appears to be theory of ethos, based on the possession of the central dramatic tradition. Its central idea is one that is also integral to Liberal, the point of epiphany. (In the epic tradition this is the shield of Achilles in the Iliad & the sun in Dante; more doubtfully the bow in the Odyssey & the bough in Aeneid.) The overtones & ramifications of the point of epiphany are: Aristotle’s recognition or discovery; the emblem or talismanic object coming to that point; the epiclesis or transubstantiation point in the mass (the mass having the same relation to the archetypal undisplaced ritual that scripture has to the definitive myth); the conjunction of kairos (↓) and the timeless moment (↑), & so on & so on. Involved with it of course are all the dialectic separations of light from dark, reality from shadow or eidolon or mask, & the whole anima-persona set up. (In the Bible the point of epiphany is anywhere in the life of Christ, that being a sequence of definitive epiphanies, particularly the nativity, the baptism or epiphany proper, the overcoming of the Tempter, the transfiguration, the agony in the garden, the death on the cross, the resurrection, the ascension.)

[48] I think I should hang on to the “science” thesis, because the scientific is the opposite of the systematic. Systems are crustacean & aren’t built, like bridges, to stand stress & strain; science is organic, with its skeleton inside. Also, once you start thinking of systems, you get trapped into questions of “How can you criticize literature until?” type. Usually this is filled up with “—you study metaphysics (because of the “assumptions” involved), economics (this is Marxist, & not now fashionable), theology, aesthetics, or anything but literature[”]. Most of these assumption-marshlights lead you along a path marked “Quicksand” with the greatest plainness. There is a lot of work to be done in criticism and all “until” questions are mere pretexts for not doing it. If we need a word for this attitude, the word “phenomenological” is a good one, because it’s an even longer word than metaphysical. Actually all metaphysical questions, as the etymology of the word indicates, follow such work & don’t precede it—the same is true of aesthetics, which can’t budge an inch “until” more work is done on the theory of criticism in the different arts. Theology is not a science, but (like occultism) a system; science is incidentally systematic, & there have been no metaphysical discoveries in our time that haven’t (properly) followed scientific discovery. Thomism is the analogy of science: I think Dante’s sun expresses something of this.

[49] When I was working on The Tempest I discovered that the Classical art-nature topos cleared a surprising amount of it up. I have a notion that all the mysterious magicians & females & stuff in Romantic fiction (E. T. A. Hoffman, Hawthorne, George Macdonald) would clear up pretty fast too if I’d fish out the kernel of the Romantic version of this topos. Wonder who’d give it to me. Shelley, maybe, though I’ve never got much of a grip on Shelley. The gist of it, of course, is (a) art & nature are not pre-existing orders but different expressions of a common hidden creative process (the creative-genetic identification is part of this) (b) this process is below the physical world, not above it (c) hence it’s morally ambivalent. But there’s so much more to it. I take it that this is an essential key to Anticlimax, if that begins with topoi in literary criticism (4l) & fans out to topoi in commentary (4k) & thence to speculative thought. I note that my present scheme starts with mythoi but picks up a specific genre as it goes along—it always has, of course. Also they seem to open out logically from one another. Tragicomedy from Liberal via the point of epiphany, Anticlimax from Tragicomedy via the parabasis metamorphosis I’ve worked out elsewhere, Rencontre from Anticlimax via comminution & fragmentation. That may mean they’ll foreshorten, naturally.
Still, AC [Anatomy of Criticism] was a four-book idea that collapsed into one, & this, starting as a one-book idea on the same general scale, may expand into four. If not, there isn’t any four, except as books to read.

There seem to be three strands of tradition in modern poetry. The Mallarmé-Valéry one is hermetically sealed poetic diction; the Laforge-Corbière-Eliot one is a deliberately violent juxtaposing of the hermetic & the naturalistic. The disintegrative tradition that goes through Rimbaud & Jarry seems to me the one that develops in Pound & Wyndham Lewis, & that seems to me art for an invisible bureaucracy, an art without dignity. Only I haven’t the connections clear.

Containing topos for Greek epic, taken from Hesiod but applicable to Homer & some Plato (e.g. the Laws):
1. Golden Age (reign of Cronos)
2. Ideal of human justice (Astraea myth).
3. Good Eris: works founded on the natural cycle.
4. Bad Eris: war leading to fate.

The Iliad deals with 4, with the shield of Achilles giving us 3. (The shield is where the moon could well be in a later topos frame, hence its association with the moon in Paradise Lost I). The same topos, pretty well, is in Plato. Top level of nous, knowledge of, possessed only by the philosopher-king; then dianoia, knowledge about, the enforced will of the just state’s guards; then pistis, works & days of the artisan, then eikasia, or the pursuit of shadows. The stuff I’ve got on Zeus as the projection of the poet’s will is the connecting link.

Containing topos for the Christian period:
2. Order of human nature or golden age, lost at the Fall & partially recoverable through law, education, virtue & the like. This is the world of “art” which is also part of nature.
3. Order of physical nature, morally neutral but theologically fallen, hence permeated by death & corruption in 4.
4. Disorder of sin & evil.

Containing topos for Romanticism (tentative).
1. World of automatism & mysterious power: Shelley’s Jupiter, Blake’s Urizen, Byron’s Arimanes, Hardy’s Immanent Will.
2. Conceptual world of nature as structure or system: the aesthetic or contemplative order of nature.
3. World of nature as process & of man as existentially engaged.
4. World of creative power within man & nature: morally ambivalent, hence the Romantic Agony, & only epiphanically manifest. (In such a poet as Valéry the theme is invisible to the poet himself, like a Kantian Ding an Sich.)

I imagine the Greek topos frame works pretty well for Latin too—Virgil’s Eclogues are 2 or 1; the Georgics are 3; the Aeneid is 4 in “theme” & 2 in telos. I really need Gaster’s “topocosm,” only in another context.

Coming back around that same circle again:
Liberal  Continuous Fictional Forms.
Tragicomedy  Episodic Fictional Forms.
Anticlimax  Continuous Thematic Forms.
Rencontre  Episodic Thematic Forms.

Liberal would have six main sections, as follows:
1. Mythical Narrative. Two sections, one (probably the second) dealing with the Bible and the other with what I used to call the Druid analogy.\textsuperscript{38} Anyway, it’s the undisplaced quest from creation to apocalypse. Whether it includes the apocalyptic-demonic-cyclical paradigm or not I’m not sure, but it probably does. (Alpha & C major)

2. Naive Romance. The Orc cycle and the quest myths. Two Brothers & other folk-tale patterns; the Jason-Hercules-Perseus-Theseus patterns; the white goddess and the black bride; St. George & the Dragon, the four stages of myth expanded (agon-pathos-sparagmos-anagnorisis). (Beta & A minor)

3. Mimetic & Romantic Encyclopaedic Forms. In other words, the Homer-Virgil-Milton tradition including Dante & Spenser, & expanding in the Gilgamesh direction (the point being that sophistication expresses archetypes & doesn’t conceal them). That far, the book is an expansion of my encyclopaedic-forms section, with epic as the climax. (Gamma & G major)


5. Sentimental Romance. The core of what I used to think was the Rencontre theme. Goethe & Victor Hugo as the basis; some side glances at Scott, Hawthorne, Melville & various survivals (Macdonald, Morris, Tolkien). By way of Conrad & Virginia Woolf it merges into (no: this more likely Delta–E m. [minor])

6. Ironic Myth. Mainly Joyce & Proust, & returning via FW [\textit{Finnegans Wake}] to the opening theme. I suppose the anatomy tradition is involved—blast that double meaning of fictional. (Zeta–B m).\textsuperscript{39}

Then Tragicomedy would be, more or less:

1. The Great Wheel of Epiphanies. The total myth of Liberal arranged as a cycle of episodes, and the role of recognition emblems in drama & elsewhere. (Eta–A maj.)

2. The Generic Cycle of Drama, Epos & Lyric. More or less what I have. (Theta–F# m. [minor])

3. The Structure of Comedy, more or less as is. (Iota–E)

4. The Phases of Comedy, in other words the SE & NE quadrants. (Kappa–C# m).

5. The Structure of Tragedy, as is (Lambda–B)

6. The Phases of Tragedy (NW & SW quadrants). The romantic & ironic phases would have been covered in Liberal. (Mu–G# m).

A possible title for Tragicomedy is The Well-Tempered Critic.

The next two are of course much vaguer. Anticlimax has to do with the relation of metaphor to concept, mechanical & other models of thought, confession & anatomy, the highest form for prose, metaphysics & metahistory, the rhetoric of non-literary prose, the conceptual verbal epic, the existential nature of dialogue as distinct from treatise, Plato as the existential & St. Thomas as the systematic pegs, the gospel or biography of divinity as a discontinuous sequence of epiphanies, the oratorical historical epiphany (Pauline epistle & Leninist pamphlet). The basis would be a total thematic myth parabatically related to the scriptural fictional one. The supreme prose form is probably a commentary on Scripture.

Rencontre has always been a mysterious book, and the overall scheme seems to imply that it’s about lyric. But everything I actually know about lyric at present—the stuff I begin my course with—is fictional, & belongs in Tragicomedy if not in Liberal. I think Rencontre deals with the disintegration of prose and verse into the charm-commandment, the proverb-epigram, the riddle-parable, the oracle-epiphany. It’s a cabalistic book, & has much to say about Rimbaud, Jarry, Cummings, Smart & other disintegrators. It searches for the koan or text, & at the end returns to Scripture. Its basis again is the great wheel of epiphanies, but conceived thematically rather than fictionally.

I could get started on 1–3 of Liberal this summer: if I cracked that I could read mimetic fiction & sentimental romance easily enough in the intervals of the academic term. The only tough part of
Tragicomedy is the first chapter—what’s tough about it is that I ought to have a pretty clear notion of it before I can write Liberal. In fact the first chapters of Liberal & Tragicomedy might well be worked out together. The historical origin of Tragicomedy is the sequence of rituals of which the total myth is the connection.

[62] I feel now not so much that Liberal is a “Protestant” book as that that’s the relation of Liberal to Anticlimax. Also that lyric is in Rencontre, the lyric part of Tragicomedy being really epos, because fictional. As I said in AC [Anatomy of Criticism], I never did figure out the distinction between epos & lyric anyway. The recognition emblem in any case is a Tragicomedy theme. Rencontre deals with the limits of verbal expression, N & S (the divine teacher who doesn’t write & the demagogue) as well [as] E & W. It’s a book I’ll need some Hebrew for, & a smattering of Oriental culture.

[63] Wonder how the following would do as a tentative scheme for Anticlimax:

Nu, F#. The relation of myth & metaphor to conceptual language; constructive & descriptive elements of verbal patterns; mechanical & other models of thought.

Omicron (or Xi; I always forget which comes first), E-flat m. The approximation of mythoi to “metahistory”; oratory; the function of existential situation-writing (Pauline epistle, Leninist & other pamphlets).

Xi (or omicron, as above), D-flat. Metaphysics & Verbal Construct. Doodle & diagram in thought; metaphor & theology; abstracted metaphor of the X-has-the idea-Y-in-his-head type, etc.

Pi, B-flat minor. The confession form of prose fiction & its relation to the “propaedic” treatise.

Rho, A-flat. The oratory form & the dialogue: the lurking existential inner conflict & aloofness in the inner dialogue or discontinuous forms.

Sigma, F m. [minor]. The greatest form for prose; the commentary on Scripture or total conceptual myth; gospel as a discontinuous sequence of epiphanies.

[64] Now that lyric, or at any rate epos, is in Tragicomedy, that becomes a much richer, though of course more difficult, book, & less a rewriting of the relevant parts of AC [Anatomy of Criticism]. It tends to make Rencontre very mysterious indeed, almost cabbalistic, perhaps a book I’ll need some jet propulsion to write. The occult aspect of it will result from the thematic analysis of the fictional cosmogonies. I think Blake & perhaps Wagner will bulk largely in it (because it’s a jumping off point for Mirage). Anyway, I assume it returns to the Bible in the D minor or Omega chapter.

[65] At present I’m trying to get hold of Liberal by way of “possessing” the epic series, and that tends to make me think of a series of tour de force expositions, say of the Bible in 1, Spenser in 2, Milton in 3, Blake (or if Blake doesn’t fit William Morris or conceivably even Hawthorne) in 4, no choice yet in 5, but maybe Conrad or Woolf, Joyce in 6. But of course everything gets mixed up right away, and this series might be Part Two of the book.

[66] Anyway, 1 being based on the Bible, it leads straight to the apocalyptic, demonic, & (or perhaps in 2) cyclical symbols; also the sequence of mythical narratives worked out for naive romance by Gaster & Ragland & such. Then the narrative sequences like creation-fall; flood; journey from Egypt through labyrinth (which develops an important form of a journey from Carthage, involved with Aeneid, St. Augustine & the Somnium Scipionis [of Cicero], & continuing through Chaucer & The Tempest & The Waste Land); defense of castle & building of house for god (Judges-Kings) and fall of house.

[67] Something in the invariable way in which, in the Renaissance, poetry is always described in terms of music: not only is the poet always singing, but even pastoral poetry is piping on a reed. I know there’s nothing new here, but why the complete elimination of speech imagery in so rhetorical an age?

[68] I suppose, just as every metaphor turns its back on logic, so in every convention there’s a heart of something irrational, not like life but deliberately cutting across it. The enragèd cuckold, the disgraced
maiden (Clarissa), the king’s rash promise—in short, all the maddened ethics of fairyland—are in direct conflict with what sensible people in any age would accept as human behavior. If life imitates literature, literature certainly confuses life.

[69] I think this point about the irrationality of convention of great importance. Literature contains life by turning its back on it ironically; but to use it as a guide to life is the wildest pedantry. Tragedy is irrational in its catastrophe; comedy in its manipulated happy ending; romance in its unreal setting & characterization; irony in its regimentation of behavior. How many plots, from Hamlet & Othello to Grade Z movies, are motivated by stupidity & lack of ordinary sense?

[70] The long epic (Odyssey & Aeneid) breaks in two: so does Lord Jim, & so frequently does Dickens (Little Dorrit; perhaps Bleak House; perhaps David Copperfield). Usually the first part is quest & the second has unity of place; but Little Dorrit reverses the procedure. Is Dickens the man I want for 5? Let’s see: Bible-Spenser-Milton-Blake-Dickens-Joyce. Sounds plausible. The Bible, as we have it, also splits in two: law & gospel are both prophetic fictions, one of a wandering quest & the other of a single personality. No split in Joyce—at least not in FW [Finnegans Wake]—U [Ulysses] follows the Odyssey, but not in proportion.

[71] Note that allegory is so special a technique that it’s possible to make a full archetypal analysis of FQ [The Faerie Queene] without ever mentioning it.

[72] The subject of koans, which I think is a Rencontre theme, is of considerable importance. In the theory of education, for instance, we all know how silly it is to get a smattering of a lot of things instead of a knowledge of a few things; but such koans as “balanced,” “all-round man,” and the like, keep pulling us the wrong way. The koans about “keeping up with things” are even worse. These are negative koans, or clichés: positive ones come into, say, Yeats, who picked up one from Mallarmé, & one from de Lisle Adam & have left critics panting to establish “influences” from these writers ever since. The slogans in Dante’s Purgatory, functioning like comic-strip balloons, go here: so do all slogans and more especially mottoes (verbal ecphrasis or whatever it is). Very, very tentative for (just to have something):


Upsilon, C m [minor]: the east & west limits of literature (action & wordless thought). My jargon stuff plus some effort to indicate what the legitimate boundaries of verbal expression are.

Phi, B-flat: the north & south limits of literature (from the teacher who doesn’t write to the rabble-rouser). I have a note earlier [pars. 35, 62] on the beginnings of this: koans belong here too.


Psi, F: The circumference of verbal expression: hypothetical & existential modes; possession of the Word. The relation of the poetic & the mystical attitudes to words.

Omega, D m. The comminution of the word: Pataphysique 45 & verbal digestion; triliteral roots of the word in Hebrew; Aum & the alphabet. I know very little about this as yet.

[74] Such matters as the function of rhetorical lying; advertising, panegyrics, saying the right thing at the right time (time is, to coin a phrase, of the essence)—the whole epideictic flummery which is absolutely essential to society—belong in the earlier chapters. Poetry & belief of course run all through; the function of criticism as meditation which underlies the conception of koan & mantra. The kind of dither I got into when I first read the sun cantoes of the Paradiso belongs here too. So does the hint I dropped about the reinterpretation of legal & theological formulas as a branch of criticism in AC. 46

[75] Only as yet there doesn’t seem too much room for including what I call “Permanent Problems of Criticism,” except incidentally.
My stuff on Milton’s music certainly belongs, & here’s an ancient note I’ve just rescued from five years back: “high katabasis: incarnation or descent of superior spirit: drop of dew {Marvell}, lady in Comus, microcosm imagery.  Middle katabasis: death; identification with bleeding flower; metamorphosis, wheel of fortune turning.  Low katabasis: descent into hell; no exit; sparagmos.  Low anabasis: escape from hell or prison; Cyclops; Mutability; Satan in Eden; rebellion & loosening of chaos {Gunpowder Plot explosion in Milton}; Harrowing of Hell; Jonah & fishing.  Middle anabasis: birth of individual or society; marriage; revival or return from absence; piled logs; tower & mt. [mountain] climbing.  High anabasis: redemption; sacred marriage; king & beggar maiden; black bride; question.  High assimilated to dialectic; middle cyclical; low are the cycle.”

Conventions are irrational also in detail: the swan, which can’t sing, made into an emblem of song; the dove as an emblem of chastity, though to the casual observer it does not appear unduly chaste (hence originally associated, with more reason, with Venus).  Such teeheeing criticisms as those of Graves about linnets & asphodels are a bit beside the point.

Poetry, says Aristotle, is more philosophical than history [Poetics, 1451b].  As there is no obvious sense in which Sappho, say, is more philosophical than Thucydides, this remark must be interpreted diagrammatically, as Sidney & others did interpret it.

It seems to me that the first Virginia lecture might well be the bulk of the Kenyon one, the encyclopaedia article about varieties of rhythm, & leading up to what I call the second twist on the prose fiction hunch.  First, Jourdain was wrong.  Three fundamental verbal rhythms, associative or ordinary speech, conventionalized as verse (primitive) or logical-prosaic.  Poetry not a critical term.  Three “pure” rhythms all continuous, then mixtures.


b. Verse to prose.  Couplet (in English) to blank verse with its prose rhythm (Browning) to Hudibrastic knittelvers in Byron & Browning.  Here again parody & discontinuity (digression).

c. Associational to verse: increase of sound-patterns, dream-verse (Spenser, Poe, Hopkins, Pearl); again paradox & discontinuity (break of Alexandrines in Spenser; theory in Poe; viol-violet-vine [The City in the Sea, l. 23]).

d. Verse to association (no, that’s the above; what follows is really c, association to verse).  Nursery rhymes, incremental repetition, the catalogue; house that Jack built; lilacs in Amy Lowell; Whitman & the line-pause.  Ossian.

e. Prose to association: speech of uneducated or confused (Quickly, Juliet’s nurse, Mrs. Nickleby & Jingle).  Literary developments in Sterne & Joyce & Stein—early stage in Shaw.  Private world in Dylan Thomas, if that’s the right end; but I think it’s oracular.

f. Association to prose.  Babble in Smart.  Continuous prose democratic; aloofness in aphorism.  Leads to sutra or koan (Yeats).  Problem of Coleridge.  I think this is reversed too.

Somewhere about here is the windup of this lecture & the transition to the second lecture, which has the general theme of literature as possession.  I haven’t this as clear, but its themes include:

Just as rabble-rousers are below verbal expression, so great religious teachers are above it: Jesus & Buddha don’t write, but express themselves in parables & aphorisms; Lao Tze writes the minimum.

Sense of engagement in Pauline epistles, Lenin’s manifestoes, prophetic oracles of Bible, where tents of Kedar [Psalm 120:5], Alexander the coppersmith [2 Timothy 4:14], anti-Dühring controversies become of world-wide significance.
Discontinuity, riddle, paradox, aphorism, sense of existential reserve, are the literary ways of expressing possession. Gospels could only be discontinuous epiphanies (cf. the text, & the proof-text in Bunyan & elsewhere)

The cultivated man’s power to quote & the fascination of The Waste Land.

Aesthetic judgement one in which anxieties are quieted, hence detached & cathartic; but literary experience is not a discrete series of goose pimples (Poe, Clive Bell). Taste (Lamb) vs. anxious judgement (Coleridge, Ruskin, Chesterton). Overcoming of the stock response & the re-engagement process. Archetypes, of course; but that isn’t my main theme.

Richards (Pr. Cr. [Practical Criticism]) raises question of what standards are appropriate to meditation. His are neo-Stoic, & Eliot had fun with them without meeting the question he raised. Note that paradoxical & discontinuous forms express the rhythm of meditation, as distinct from attention.

The question of what standards are applicable to meditation or existential valuation are the subject of the third lecture, which apparently begins by establishing my words-into-patterns point. In this connexion the sense of the oracular element in verse as a nexus for meditation (hence the Vita Nuova & St. John of the Cross forms) comes up. Then, in some way I’m not clear about yet, I go into the question of analogy (simile) and identity (metaphor), & arrive at an apocalyptic or total-identification standard for literary judgement. See my doodles for Anticlimax & Rencontre—I always seem to move my next targets out to the horizon.

[80] Wonder if my metahistory paper would be of any use for the Harvard myth boys? Seems to me I’ve used some of that somewhere. I don’t suppose my ladder of analogy is of any immediate use for 3V. Analogy is the principle of wit & of the outward presentation of literature generally; identity is the principle of inner coherence (with) and of existential possession (as). The two important forms are the subject-object identity, and the individual-universal one. The silly split into a subjective-qualitative-sun rising poetic universe and an objective-measurable-earth revolving scientific one. Also there’s some connexion between allegory & rhetoric (Longinus on Marathon & John Robins on Alfred) I haven’t got clear.

[81] I must brood about analogy and identity. Analogy is the main technique of wit, and humorous metaphor is essentially unexpected analogy, as I’ve said; but these are given by the writer. There’s something I haven’t got clear about transfers from writer to reader. As Valéry says, inspiration refers to the reader, not the writer, so does morality. Now there’s something about the changeover from discursive to literary expression (e.g. the change from oratio obliqua to recta) that has to do with transferring consonantia, or connective tissue, to the reader. This has been obvious only in modern times with modern theories of discontinuous sequential epiphanies & metaphor by juxtaposition; but it’s always been there: in fact it’s in the conception of ut pictura poesis itself. I think somewhere in here is the clue to literature as possession: the author & reader may have different connective frameworks, but the same epiphanic sequence fits both. It’s also a clue to the whole progression from Liberal architectonics to Rencontre fragmentation.

[82] Also I think for my next Harvard myth paper I should wade straight into displacement. Use my Great Expectations hunch, my Uncle Silas-Egoist comparison, maybe Handley Cross, & various Hawthorne & Morris hunches—perhaps Scott and Robinson Crusoe as well. Well, I didn’t, though I did start on it.

[83] Re the constructive imagination: notice in magic how strong the instinct is to complete a pattern. If you’re summoning a spirit by the seventy-two names of God, it won’t do if you can only remember sixty-five of them. Used in Spenser paper.
The famous opening sentences of *Pride & Prejudice* & of *Anna Karenina* are vestigial conventions deriving from the exemplum convention: one can trace it back to the *Decameron*, where every story is preceded by general statements which the story is supposed to illustrate. *Rasselas*, the first chapters of the books of *Tom Jones*, etc.

In 19th c. ghost stories note the desperate effort at realism given by anonymity: “Mr. _____ of _____th Street.” Also the telling of the tale to a small circle, which I’ve noted, sometimes develops a chorus role out of the hearers, who comment at the end, etc.

In the epic the point of return home is often mysterious. In the *Odyssey* the hero sleeps in the cave of the nymphs & wakes up in Ithaca. In the *Inferno* the passage through to the other side of the world goes by in half a line. The Argonauts evidently hoisted the Argo somewhere around Moscow & portaged it out to the Baltic. Something of waking up from a dream, of course. It’s Freud’s link with the unfathomable: note how Beethoven pretends to lose his way in sonata forms just before the recapitulation; remember *Lycidas* & the appeal to tradition as the poet returns from wandering: in Xy [Christianity] one dies to return. Conceptual analogues of it should be traced, in Wordsworth’s *Prelude* & elsewhere.

It seems to me that the encyclopaedic poem is something from which epic & drama both descend, an obvious point that’s still been confusing me. For instance, Shakespeare doesn’t appear to know the *Aeneid* 7-12, but the *Metamorphoses* was his Bible: he owes more to it than to Terence or Seneca. If so, then the formula for the tetralogy is to start each with the encyclopaedic hypothesis as it incorporates itself in (Liberal) the cosmological poem, thence epic (Tragicomedy) the ritual *Thespis* sequence, thence auto Anticlimax the prose legalistic Scripture, thence *sage* Rencontre the lyric Psalm-Veda sequence, thence ode. Only I must be careful not to say that these “themes” are chronological. Ovid’s Metamorphoses is prior to the Iliad, Calderon prior to Euripides, in my scheme.

I stumbled quite by accident on the distinction between metaphorical crucial and realistic continuous recognition in writing the Harvard paper. But it’s a very fruitful one. In working out a recognition-in-Shakespeare-comedy paper I should keep it in mind as well as the mythical and thematic distinction. Yeats’ dialogue of self & soul is really an application of it: the soul wants crucial recognition or a one-for-all identity with reality; the self wants a continuous recognition or realistic happiness. Death symbolizes the former. I wonder if that leads to a distinction between (a) literature as continuous possession (power to quote & allude) (b) literature as epiphanic initiation, where what we are reading exhibits the whole of literature. It looks as though I can’t finish the Virginia series without picking this up.

Surely in any response to a work of art there comes a split in the personality. Wrong or associative response is pure identification; right or direct response is one in which a specific skill is separated off from the rest of the personality. The separation obviously is not complete, or we’d get schizophrenia. But tragic emotions, for instance, are not real (in the sense of identified) emotions: we watch our emotions reacting. A hypothetical self exposed to the work of art, & a cultivated self then examines its pointer readings. Partridge & the second part of *Pamela* it even can be another person.

I thought I had this in: in reading Tolkien, which I did with great & almost uncritical pleasure, it nevertheless struck me, somewhere around Appendix VI, that there was a point at which the imaginative turns into the imaginary.

I think a sizeable part of my next job has to do with a Bergonian diagram of the creative process. At the bottom is dream, the shaping of experience into wish-fulfilment patterns. Below it are the aberrations of neurosis, the attempts to impose these directly on experience. By dream I mean, as I meant in AC [*Anatomy of Criticism*], the entire conflict of wish & reality. Above dream the diagram divides.
One side is waking life & work; the other ritual & play. Above work is science, the study of the world as it is; above play is magic, which includes some aspects of art. The two sides combine in art proper, the transformation of the world as it is into the world man wants to live in. Above art is religion, for those who believe it to be existential & substantial. Bugs in this, naturally; but the general outline has something.

[92] Persecution, like war, always has to be done over again. When the last witches were being executed Rousseau was born, & that initiated a revival of all the anti-Christian stuff—the divine god as physically present in Fascism, reincarnation in Nietzsche, etc. Yeats & Lady Kyteler. Christianity is now reaping what it sowed, I suppose—I dunno.

[93] The poet is a licensed liar vis-à-vis history: vis-à-vis thought he is a constructor of thought-patterns. As he thinks typically or recurrently he’s conservative, even atavistic: hence his applications of his constructs, from Cicero & Pompey to Pound & Mussolini, are normally chuckle-headed. After all, they’re only poets.

[94] Dryden’s *Grounds of Criticism in Tragedy* makes a small but useful link: in Sidney poetry combines the historical example & the moral precept: the former is the *mythos* & the latter the *dianoia*. Now the *dianoia* is, at least in modern literature, normally represented by a symbol or emblem.

[95] The Vancouver talk started with my usual stuff on nursery rhyme, then established that ordinary speech is associative & not prose, then said that associative babble was the voice of the ego, which is always sub-literary, that this ego-voice is projected in the dead-language, ation-ation, rhythmless *impersonal* jargon of the lonely crowd. That the impersonal babble is the voice of the collective or aggregate ego, & according to Kierkegaard “essentially demoralizing.” It consists in prodding reflexes of [the] inattentive, & is seen in advertising, then propaganda, then exhortatory jargon of the collective tantrum kind. Half-assed Rousseausism that takes the untrained act to be free, whereas the free act is always disciplined. Real prose as articulate & disciplined speech: this alone is free speech. To speak as a personality assumes that the hearer is one too: hence it creates a community. Or, in fashionable terminology, personal speech is dialogue: babble, egocentric or collective, always monologue. The ordinary prose treatise, as distinct from a work of fiction, is implicit dialogue.

[96] The breaking of the current of habit-energy in the *individual* produces the epiphanic moment or *illumination*. It also splits off the continuously babbling, grousing, mumbling ego. The voice of this ego was first isolated in literature, I think, by Dostoevsky in *Notes from Underground*, & it’s the staple of Beckett. It enters English poetry in *Prufrock*. To isolate it means it knows itself, hence the tone of querulous & cynical honesty about itself.

[97] I have never understood why the question of “beauty” should have a peculiarly close relationship to the arts; beauty may be predicated of many things that are not works of art. Works of art seem to me to be concerned with a certain kind of structure, or process, found in them but not in other things. Structure if, with the Classical critics, we assert the priority of the hen; process if, with the Romantics, we assert the priority of the egg.

[98] In the Great Doodle (apocalyptic) the spiritual world is (a) the fire-world of heavenly bodies (b) the lower heaven or sky. Hence it is normally (a) red with the seraphim (b) blue with the cherubim. Blue & white mean virginity, red & white love; red white & green is the point of epiphany.

[99] The final value-judgement to be made is not on the poem but on the critic. Is he a genuine critic or does he only start on the cultural level of a bazaar letter-writer? In these days of tens of thousands of people engaged in scholarship & criticism, not all can be genuine. And even genuine ones like Leavis can set up wrong conceptions of criticism to mislead others. The genuine critic is traditionally a judge, but illiterate judges make for injustice: if they are not servants of the law they are of little use on a bench. The
law in this case can only be scholarship or knowledge of literature: criticism from start to finish is knowledge, not a guide to the love of beauty.

I’ve been trying to read Plotinus (in McKenna) with little success. I don’t mean I can’t get through him, but he doesn’t give me any ideas. The positivistic streak in me is much stronger than I thought—I keep saying this is shit, although I thought temperamentally I was akin to it. I ain’t. However. If McKenna’s admirable style represents the original, it’s an interesting style: discontinuous, easy-going meditative, question-&-answer rhythm, which is partly addressed to a reader & partly not. It’s an Avatamsaka rhythm too: each tractate is the centre of the system, so that a sufficiently astute disciple could reconstruct the whole system from any one.

In the book (it’s beginning to feel like a book) I have to begin with the conception of a verbal universe, & people like Plotinus come into it. Cosmology, it seems to me, always has aesthetic elements built into it: things are so because they must be, it’s right for them to be that way, it fits. These are features that are at first projected as existentially true: as this becomes impossible, they become revealed as speculative rhetoric, as a verbal presentation of knowledge from the circumference, or the vision of the world man wants to live in. But it’s of course a great error to assume that the value of these systems dries up as soon as they lose their scientific potentiality. The Virginia lectures should end about where the book begins.

Virginia III’s main theme is: distinction of verbal structures between the centrifugal ones pointed to external reality & centripetal ones that draw their circumference so as to shut out external reality (madness of metaphor, conventions, etc., as Theseus; internal consistency, as Hippolyta). The circumference of the order of words contains all these, & the order of words is the verbal model of civilization & culture. That’s why it includes cosmology, as above. Reality for science is what’s there, & won’t go away. Reality for art’s what’s there compared with the imaginative model. So there is centrifugal alignment in the arts too: that raises the question of higher belief. There’s a private model, constructed of clichés & quotations & koans, to be compared with a total model, & the verbal model intervenes. Reflex verbalism in advertising, cliché, dead language trying to be impersonal—is based on existing society as ultimate reality. The fact that the model human world naturally tends to contain all human categories, including time & space, creates a verbal alliance with religion.

If we ask what is the natural way to talk, the answer is what nature is being asked about. Art is man’s nature: free acts are disciplined acts; free speech is cultivated speech. Cultivated speech creates community, because it’s an expression of a genuine personality & assumes that the hearer is one too. From the beginning rhetoric has been divided into three styles, the high, the middle & the low. Cultivated speech is middle style. Low, today, is Mencken’s “vulgate” or American colloquial. It should not be studied as a sub-standard speech. It has its own kind of sentence-structure, imagery, humor & vocabulary. It’s not ungrammatical, but in some places it’s anti-grammatical. Some class tension here. Middle speech is grammatical, but should never be judged by its grammar.

Now there is also a debased or bastard speech of the unregenerate nature. For some reason, in contrast to England, where speech habits are built into the structure of society, the prejudice against cultivating an accent is so powerful that ordinary speech is largely left to original sin. Examples heard around Victoria compare favorably in vocabulary with the tarts on Jarvis Street, being less monotonously obscene, but the grammar & accent are much the same. Such noises are pure monologue, the voice of the pure ego. Educationally, the most efficient way of curing it is by an appeal to social snobbery, but schools & universities have nothing to do with such things. Pygmalion could not be written here.
I have occasionally wondered why I couldn’t keep diaries. The answer is that I’m too busy with other writing—the only times I succeeded in keeping a diary more than a week or two were in doldrum periods of writing\(^1\). Now I’m so full of commissions & deadlines I can’t even keep notebooks.

What’s more, I can’t even read anything except bloods. In Michael Innes I notice the device of deliberate over-designing, a parody for sophisticated readers of the absurdities of schoolboy romances.\(^2\) It’s a structural analogue to deliberate doggerel. Wonder if I could work out a structural parallel to the second Page-Barbour?\(^3\)

The first Milton lecture\(^4\) will deal with the Liberal epic theme. I’ve always clearly recognized two things: the fact that the narrative structure of P.L. \(*Parade Lost*\) follows the Odyssey-Aeneid one & not the Iliad one, and the fact that the scriptural form of the Bible & Ovid’s \(*Metamorphoses*\) is distinguishable as an encyclopaedic form. Now Dante’s form is the thematic stasis of the Bible, being a Last Judgement apocalypse. If I could see the Iliad form as the thematic stasis of the Odyssey-Aeneid one I’d be through that. That’s probably too much to expect. Spenser clearly felt that FQ \(*The Faerie Queene*\) was a thematic stasis of Ariosto: figure of Prince. If the Iliad did have any such role, it ought to dramatize the four levels of Cronos, Astraea, shield of Achilles & jars of Zeus. It does, of course, up to a point; but it’s not self-conscious as a thematic stasis normally is.

I stumbled on something in the Masseys that may be important. The creative subconscious is potentially communicable, and so it’s different from the Freudian subconscious. It’s social & not individual—it has links with Jung’s collective unconscious, but I don’t know what they are.\(^5\) Finnegans Wake, anyway, is about that subconscious. Reading Margaret Murray’s books on witchcraft,\(^6\) one can’t believe any part of her argument that assumes an actual religious organization, but that some subconscious demonic parody of Xy [Christianity] was extracted from all those poor creatures under torture is quite obvious, and its consistency doesn’t surprise me: it’s the same kind of thing primitive tribes produce, often by self-administered torture. The witch-finder himself was a psychopath, or soon became one by sticking pins all over naked women, and so they were linked in a communal dream.

I’m beginning to realize that my principle of scholarship having the power of veto over taste really means that instruction is primary in literature, & entertainment secondary.\(^7\) This is of course what’s assumed in our feeling that “escape” literature is substandard. Instruction of course is not illustrating moral precepts, but expanding the power of vision: the Romantic shift of dianoia from allegory to archetypal framework not only put the arts in the centre, but by doing so made them primarily instructive.

I’ve said that in Arnold a church is judged primarily by the quality of its worldliness. In the great variety of “denominations” today, there’s of course no question but what they all have to be tolerated. To view them all with equal respect would be nonsense: some of them are bloody stupid, & their adherents can only be classified as either dupes or dopes. The most normal standard to take is an educational one. Every religion is a sort of golfer’s handicap: the question is, how much intellectual honesty can one attain in spite of it? My own religious attitude is based on a negative answer to the question: is it possible to attain greater intellectual honesty without any religious handicap? Every religion is damn silly in some respect or other, being a product as well as a discovery of original sin. But no attitude could be completely sensible unless some form of religious intuition could come true.

In connection with what I say about literature swallowing life,\(^8\) note how Dante, Spenser & Milton all eliminate the third level of experience. Paradise, heaven & hell in Milton; Paradiso, Purgatorio & Inferno in Dante; Faerie (2nd level) in Spenser with glints of heaven & hell, but no direct confrontation with experience. It doesn’t fit epic.

The next two major jobs I have to do are a series of lectures on Milton & another series, probably on Shakespeare.\(^9\) I wonder if I could make them, not the definitive forms, but the growing points, of
Liberal & Tragicomedy respectively. The point is that I can’t do any large group of these books (if, as I say, I am to write them instead of reading them) until they are simultaneously clear in my mind. The ultimate Liberal wouldn’t have to be about Milton, but it would have to have Milton as a supporting caryatid, so to speak. Meanwhile I need to bring an immense amount of fiction-reading into focus, & I’m thinking of starting with Balzac. I’ve always had blocks about fiction, and one of the worst is reading a novel, bursting with ideas about it, & then being too lazy to record the ideas. The Balzac-Stendhal-Flaubert block of ignorance in my knowledge of literature badly needs to be removed.

My topocosm for the Greeks, 1 Olympian symposium, 2 golden age 3 good Eris or the shield of Achilles 4 bad Eris or fate is Apollonian. It doesn’t incorporate the Dionysiac really, though of course 3 could be Dionysiac—Dicaeopolis in The Acharnians [of Aristophanes], who’s certainly on 3 with mirrors of 2, celebrates the feast of Dionysus. But I wonder if Euripides (Bacchae) doesn’t represent the same kind of reversal that Romanticism makes with us?

Rephrasing of the Romantic topocosm:
1. The Frankenstein-Arimanes-Urizen-Jupiter-Immanent Will world, sometimes “up there” & associated with the sky, sometimes simply “out there,” Kafka’s penal colony & Orwell’s 1984 world, man caught in his own trap.
2. The world of experience, in a subject-object relationship. Often extended to include the given world, the traditional heritage we’re handed, Burke’s continuous world, the existing structure that conservatives want to keep & radicals destroy.
3. The world of power underneath, the ocean under the ark or bateau ivre. Often an innocent world, the sleeping beauty of nature & reason in Rousseau, Blake’s Ore & buried Beulah, Shelley’s Mother Earth & Asia. From Schopenhauer on it becomes increasingly inscrutable: menacing to conservatives & redeeming to revolutionaries; the world as will, Darwin’s evolution, Kierkegaard’s dread, Freud’s libido-id, Marx’s proletariat.
4. Mt. Aarat, Golgonooza, the garden within or under the sea, the classless society, the working compromise of evolution & ethics, & so on. Often demonic or morally ambivalent.

Irony, in the sense of the eiron’s self-deprecation, is the very essence of courtesy. Making oneself small by certain gestures, such as bowing, are central in social ritual. Attaching minimum value to what one has & maximum value to what someone else has is central in social activity. Religious & moral codes insist on pursuing this into one’s habits of thought. You may be great or good; I know I am neither. Modesty is infinitely more than a pose or a convention: as what Eliot calls humility, it’s a pre-requisite of both virtue & knowledge. The general principle seems to be: what is presented has the maximum oracular significance to be attached to it, because something may be learned there, like nature in Baudelaire’s Correspondences. What is possessed has the minimum significance, because there is always something to be learned or added.

What’s presented may be a work of art, which must be approached as though it were as great as possible, according to my own anagogic principles. The resolution of presentation & possession is identification, where one self is one with something bigger & the possessing or egocentric self cast out. What you identify with possesses you, and operates as an informing principle in your mind. Now if what’s presented is, say, a poem written centuries ago in a different cultural context, what’s the problem? Historical criticism, establishing as nearly as possible what it meant then, devalues its oracular significance. This devaluing has something to do with the fact that sacred books, approached historically, turn out to be fakes. Arthur Waley says the Analects of Confucius contain few & very probably no authentic sayings of Confucius: it’s a statement of what early Confucians believed. The Gospels dissolve into a mass of
early Christian *adagia*: everything in Homer or the Mahabharata that’s most important for belief is interpolated: the Mosaic code is stuck into a period of history centuries too early.

[117] To translate it into an informing principle is inevitably to distort its historical context: there’s no way out of that. From here it looks as though there were two ways of doing this: I may call them the church way & the scripture way. The church man has a structure of ideas derived from the institution he’s attached to, and he translates everything into conformity with the structure. The scripture man tries to keep the “dialogue” open: he respects an oracular residue that pulls him beyond the structure. The closed & the open way are perhaps better, though they imply comparison of value. I’m returning here to the remark in the *Anatomy* about criticism being part of a general activity of keeping verbal structures intact while transforming their meaning.94

[118] Some connexion too with our old friend in Proust, that the only paradises are lost ones. Golden ages *have* to be in a mythical past: they can only be presented when they’re past, & only when presented can they be oracular. What’s in process belongs to the eiron vision, & this is also true of what’s historically revealed to have been in process once. In that sense, whatever’s oracular has to be mysterious. Something here very central & simple I haven’t got yet. What is idealized is either ancient or potential (the quality in children or in young people who die full of promise). The potential is perhaps an image of the unborn.

[119] The “church” man in politics is a supporter of *de jure*, a legitimist: the “scripture” man has a greater respect for the *de facto*. Conservative & radical distinction at bottom, I suppose. For one, the informing principle is also conforming, or sacramental; for the other, it’s a liberating one.

[120] I don’t know whether this is connected or not: in Blake & Yeats there’s a good deal said about the growth, generation, death, disappearance & rebirth of units or elements of the imagination, that is, image or idea-clusters. The question is whether the individual human life is also conceivable as an imaginative element, & whether the theme of death & rebirth, disappearance as psychological event & immortality in art, can be extended to statements of belief about an afterlife. In Blake Thel’s unborn world & what’s said about the death & clothing of “spectres” in *Milton* & elsewhere95 are explicable as referring to the creation of art, but look as though they contained ideas about reincarnation too, & the role of Milton in *Milton* supports this. In Yeats “Byzantium” appears to be entirely about the generation of images, but the connexion of its themes with “All Soul’s Night,” “News from the Delphic Oracle” & “Sailing to Byzantium” make[s] the other dimension clear (or more confused, depending on the point of view).

[121] What do poets “say”?  
They say that everything is everywhere at once.  
They say that all nature is alive.  
They say that creation is dialectic, separating heaven & hell.  
They say that the material world neither is nor isn’t, but disappears.  
They say that the created world neither is nor isn’t, but appears.  
They say that the containing form of real experience is myth.  
They say that time & space are disappearing categories.  
They say that men are Man, as gods are God.  
(Copied from another notebook:96 I’m not sure of it.)

[122] Well, now, what do I do about the Bampton Lectures?97 I’d thought of a series on Shakespeare, or a series on the English Romantics. But there’s a lot to be said for just going on with critical theory, extending & developing various recent things I’ve done. I think of a set on the four gates of critical theory: roughly on the relation of literature to religion, education, action & belief—no, I mean the other
arts. Something like “Contexts of Critical Theory,” subtitled the context of belief, the context of thought, the context of action, the context of culture. Or relations: better to try to avoid metaphor in titles.

[123] Religion & belief: my false gods point; science & polytheism; existential & hypothetical. Why are sacred books historical frauds? The shape of the Bible; the contract; the argument of Job. My Avatamsaka hunch (Whitehead’s simple location). I think this should perhaps be the last one. Newman.

[124] Culture & the other arts: probably the first one, & an attempt to put the next twist on my Arts Conference speeches, the Rochester paper, & my old David Milne paper. I have a notion that Klee is going to bulk pretty large in it. Sculpture as the hypothesis of biology, & so forth. Ruskin & Arnold.

[125] Action or praxis: further on my history points: ritual & myth; vertical & horizontal perspectives; convention as blocking off the latter; imaginative heavens & hells. Rhythmical pacing & participating in narrative: study of pacing vs. structure in Jonsonian drama. Carlyle.

[126] Theoria: my education points about building up an imaginative vision: free speech & rhetoric; the relation of poetic to discursive thought; metaphor as structure of thought; the existential unit or proverb; the idea of the university; freedom of thought & expansion of its body. Mill.

[127] I’ve just been reading a thriller of Ian Fleming’s, and am astonished at the stockness of the material, combined as it is with a certain sophistication in handling concrete detail. Hero and heroine kidnapped by fiendish villains, who instead of killing them at once leave them alone & allow them to escape. Villain takes advantage of the situation to recount his life story as a cognito; heroine threatened with torture, taking the form of displaced rape. For some strange reason the word “thighs” didn’t appear, as it almost always does in that place in thrillers. Many years ago Edmund Wilson, in a New Yorker review, connected the Houdini situation with the dying & reviving god.

[128] The obvious thing to do with the Bampton’s is to start on the six parts of Liberal as outlined on p. 24 [par. 57]. My formula for this has always been: possess Homer, Virgil, Dante & Milton & then do as you like. But whenever I start on this programme I find that the notion of reading in sequence has something wrong with it. I can’t wait until I’ve read through Balzac to come to the main principles of Euripides, nor Euripides till I’ve done something with, say, Novalis. I know this is silly, but I keep coming back to the sense that Liberal & the rest are bodies of reading & not of writing: that they all interlock in such a way that my real writing problem is to keep on doing what I did in the Anatomy: find the axioms of critical procedure involved in the interlocking. I hope that doesn’t just mean a series of anatomies: I’d like to make my third book as different from AC [Anatomy of Criticism] as AC was from FS [Fearful Symmetry].

[129] The actual relationship of the first four seem to be: naive continuous (scripture & epic) = Liberal; naive discontinuous (drama & narrative lyric) = Tragicomedy; sentimental continuous (fiction & irony & late romance) = Anticlimax; sentimental discontinuous (late lyric & fragmented forms) = Rencontre. I’ve been trying to work out the next four as thematic equivalents, without much success.

[130] The distinction between fictional & thematic literature is one of the most useful things in the AC [Anatomy of Criticism]. My Daedalus paper is also one of my best papers. It seems to me that the dream & the reverie is [are] also part of the distinction, the reverie or meditation being essentially nearer to consciousness, also revolving around a central point.

[131] The romance patterns in Shakespeare that he has in common with the Grail romances are, or rather include, the substituted bride (Lancelot & Elaine) & of course the chess game. I’m as much in the dark as ever about the latter, as the bride is in the former (Rachel & Leah): I started off with it, & it still tantalizes. Note that Eliot’s Middleton references are better than I suggest, especially the WW [Women
For a long time I’ve been obsessed by the notion of writing a definitive history of English literature. I’ll never do that, of course; but why should the idea fascinate the author of the *Anatomy of Criticism*? Could it be that there’s a possibility of writing a history, based on but not confined to English, that would have the form of an incredibly complicated fugal structure? Themes from Irish myth going through Grail romance, *Tempest*, *Comus*, to Eliot & Yeats & Joyce. Biblical typology organizing the whole damn scheme? Liberal as medieval epic-romance period, ending with Spenser & Milton; Tragicomedy as drama centred on Shakespeare; Anticlimax as prose & 18th-19th c. centered; Rencontre as from Blake on? Now could I just die & get reincarnated in somebody like me & take about eighty years off to do the job?

All religions constitute an intellectual handicap: the worth of a religion depends on the intellectual honesty it permits. It’s silly to respect all religions: Anglo-Israelitism, for example, is pure shit, and cannot be accepted without destroying one’s whole sense of reality. The Mormons, the Christian Scientists, the fundamentalists, increase the handicap to the point of crippling the brain. Some handicap, probably, one must have: to accept a crippling one in any field (e.g. the Shakespeare didn’t write Shakespeare boys) is neurotic.

This is part of what clearly ought to be my next job: a study of the mythical (metaphorical & symbolic) presentation of reality, hence of the external relations of criticism. First, myth & religion: why sacred books are historical frauds: the cyclical myth. Second, myth & political thought, where creation-fall & apocalypse become the social contract & Utopia myths. Where I go from there I’m not sure.

I’ve been listening to my rococo record collection. In the 17th–18th cs. the central theme seems to be the conflict of creation & chaos, the virgin leading the monster, the enthroned sun against storm & tempest. Chaos imagery is chromatic, with the minor on its side. Haydn’s *Creation* has the chaos-prelude & the diatonic “Heavens Are Telling” I’ve noted. The Tempest variant is in Bach’s Aeolus cantata; & of course the same archetype makes Orpheus central. Kuhnau on David lashing Saul. Maybe the Beethoven 9th, beginning in tohu wa bohu [chaos and disorder] and ending in the diatonic. Ode to Joy is the summing up of this development. Probably a second development starts with Mozart & runs through to about Mahler, but I don’t know what it is. Haydn is a genius of the idyllic unfallen world: it can’t be just accident that the *Creation* & the *Seasons* sum him up. Incidentally, the spinning song in the latter is amazingly sinister: the spinning wheel of the fates. The words superficially cosy & domestic, have Vala overtones he caught, though there’s no passion or fatality as in Schubert’s Goethe song.

One very obvious point that still ought to be thought about is the imagination’s magnifying of expressed emotion. If disaster & death strike in real life, self-preservation minimizes their impact: tragedy yells bloody murder, & helps to create a more terrifying world. It has a morally beneficial impact, like conscience, by making cowards of us all. Similarly with role of contemporary irony in creating a hateful, hideous, obscene world.

One of the most important of literary virtues consists in the art of concealing an author’s personal vices. For the revelation of vice is direct address, & so boring. I don’t mind the erotic fantasies in William Morris’ romances, but the masochistic fantasies of Swinburne bore me & bother me, in that order, because Swinburne just jerking off. However, lechery is, next to gluttony, the easiest vice to conceal. The hardest one, I think, is envy. Wyndham Lewis bores me because his motive for writing is envious. Perhaps it isn’t concealment but sublimation that’s the essential. Pope doesn’t conceal spite, for instance.
Don Juan & Faust go to hell for the excessive pursuit of love and knowledge. Why do both themes tend to become farcical and popular?

Reincarnation & Christianity: they say that in a bullfight the bull learns so fast that he must be killed in the end, because no toreador would have a chance against a bull in his second fight. This seems to me a parable of human life. The horror of the wheel of existence is in the discontinuity of memory it postulates. There is a place for higher kinds of rebirth (e.g. the Bodhisattva) but even that must be qualified. The gospel says man must be reborn, metaphysically, psychologically, or whatever (water & the spirit is cryptic enough). If Jesus knew this to be essential he must have been reborn himself. The Eastern doctrine of karma says “man is born into the world he has made.” In traditional Xy [Christianity] that is true only of Jesus, who made the world & was reborn into it. So we can achieve only through him a process in which rebirth & resurrection are the same thing.

Something I haven’t got yet that comes into Proust & the Eliot quartets: subjective continuity (giants in time) and objective discontinuity. The unknown god (e.g. of Samuel Butler) is continuous: the known god discontinuous & epiphanic. This seems to be a Kantian formulation. It connects with my two Romanticism points: the continuous vehicular form and the epiphanic fragment of illumination.

Tillich distinguishes what he calls “inducting” education from humanistic or technical. He means initiatory, learning the secrets of the tribe, social & religious. I should have thought of this earlier: it’s knowledge of social, or rather, cultural, mythology, and is centripetal in shape, building up, as it did in the Middle Ages, when, as Tillich says, all education was inducting, to a summa form. Humanism, in contrast, is personal-centered and follows the centrifugal tendency to specialize. My own AC [Anatomy of Criticism] is a contribution to cultural mythology, I suppose, as a defence against what I call social mythology. Such initiation in our day is not an end but the beginning: the “core curriculum,” democratic in motivation as against Marxism, that ought to be learned by the end of high school.

In the course of being Principal I’ve often thought about the curious affinity between high intelligence and a curious kind of social immaturity. It’s the quality that makes the “intellectual” so often socially irresponsible. Partly introversion, partly living in an over-simplified Euclidean universe. This latter gives the immaturity a curious ferocity—Blake was right in associating cruelty and abstraction, the preference of mechanical extensions of the body to the body. It comes out in me in the panic of travel worries: when I change place I want to withdraw completely. Other things to, of course: I’m no exception to my own rule. My students are mostly extroverted, more mature than I socially: I worry about their intellectual immaturity, but admire the same combination in the “practical man.” One confusing feature of it is that good taste is so often a social rather than an intellectual maturity.

Intelligent and sensitive people who have been through, say, a war seldom talk about it much. If you’ve shared the experience you don’t need to be told about it, and if you haven’t telling of it somehow subtly makes the experience untrue. This, apparently, is because the basis of conversation is casual & associative. Writing about it brings in a mythical shaping form that makes it true. Yet this truth often goes with a departure from fact. In writing you’d say “June 18 dawned foggy and cold” and still feel you were about to tell the truth, whereas you’d hesitate to say that in conversation, because it was neither foggy nor cold on June 18 and you weren’t up until long past sunrise.

Further on continuous & episodic forms: continuity & consistency in habit makes [make] for dignity. The undignified can be convinced the world will end tomorrow without remembering that they were convinced of the same thing ten years ago. Communism has no human dignity because it requires the sacrifice of the memory, which is what holds consistency together. Living according to a party line of any kind surrenders continuity to something else. There is a genuine surrender of the memory, but it’s to a consistent imaginative pattern. Truth of fact becomes truth of informing myth, as above. I’m circling...
around something here, but don’t know yet what it is. It’s connected with the form of the Gospels and the fact that the unknown Father-God there is continuous and revelation through the Son episodic. No: it’s the Spirit that’s continuous: we don’t know what the Father is, or at least he eludes that dichotomy.

[145] Belief is a highly integrated & concentrated state of mind. William James speaks of a will to believe which is mostly phony. In Christian terms, belief is a matter of grace rather than will. Clergymen are naturally prone to believe that they ought to believe. Many of them can’t manage belief, & have to settle for anxieties. One can hardly discern the beliefs of Protestantism through the thick cloud of anxiety-mongering about the “liquor traffic,” or the beliefs of Catholicism through anxieties about contraceptives & meat on Fridays. Well, would you let them get into pulpits with nothing to say? As a matter of fact Jesus recommends precisely that [Matthew 10:19–20], & guarantees their inspiration, given a highly disciplined state of mind in which one has, like Mary as against Martha, got rid of importunate anxieties. As for the man who said “Help thou my unbelief” [Mark 9:24], what he was expressing was doubt about the validity of his doubts: a state of mind that might be called virtuous hypocrisy.

[146] I was disappointed, years ago, when the Supreme Court of Canada was established in place of the British one. The myth involved was the analogical one: a colony is a child, a sovereign nation an adult: puberty comes with taking one’s own powers. I wish Canada had junked this dismal cliché and been the first nation to vest supreme legislative powers in another nation: the kind of super-national conception that the Commonwealth of Nations permits.

[147] I suppose I’ll be asked to do the Weil lectures someday: if not, I’ll certainly be concerned with problems of religious articulation. Why, for instance, is prayer so unreliable a method of getting something for nothing? Because, primarily, our child’s view that God is an omnipotent being out there, floating free in space, is inadequate: God works within human life and under “fallen” human conditions. That’s why the Gospel, not the Book of Genesis, is the Christian centre. But then why do the Gospels feature miracles? I know the symbolic answers: the only real miracle is not a “sign” but the transformation of the believer, but I’m grooping for other kinds of answers.

[148] The sound of children playing is a cliché of innocent happiness. I have listened to it, and what I hear is mainly aggressiveness and hysteria. Living with children is recognized to be purgatorial, differing from hell only in having some sort of end. This is assumed to be an inscrutable but unbreakable law of nature, but I wonder if it is. I think children are aggressive & hysterical because they’re in an aggressive & hysterical society, & would be serene and dignified if society was.

[149] Compare the song of birds, which also is sexually aggressive & which we interpret as innocence, tweet rhyming with sweet. Both are aspects of homo ludens, an aggressiveness with a shift of perspective seeing it as exuberance or free play. It’s like vanity in man—or woman—which has an oddly disarming & innocent quality to it even though it’s an aspect of pride.

Notes

Abbreviations used in the Notes:

AC = Anatomy of Criticism
BG = The Bush Garden
CP = The Critical Path
EI = The Educated Imagination
FI = Fables of Identity
FS = Fearful Symmetry

NB = Notebook
NF = Northrop Frye
NFL = Northrop Frye’s Library
NP = A Natural Perspective
RE = The Return of Eden
WTC = The Well-Tempered Critic
The reference to the essay on *Paradise Regained* in the first paragraph sets the beginning of this notebook no earlier than 1956. References toward the end of the notebook to several series of lectures NF gave to papers he wrote in the early 1960s indicate that the notebook entries conclude in 1962 or perhaps early 1963.


3. See the Tentative Conclusion of *AC*.


5. A grown man feels identical with himself at the age of seven, although the two manifestations of this identity, the man and the boy, have very little in common as regards similarity or likeness. In form, matter, personality, time, and space, man and boy are quite unlike. This is the only type of image I can think of that illustrates the process of identifying two independent forms” (*AC*, 124).

6. Gilbert Ryle’s *Concept of Mind* (1949) is an attack on Cartesian dualism, which he calls “the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine,” the Ghost being the mind and the Machine the body.

7. NF believes that Spinoza’s attempt to reduce propositions to a quasi-mathematical form free of rhetorical devices is itself a rhetorical device. See NB 36.112, NB 37.3 (both unpublished), and *AC*, 329.


9. Adlai Stevenson was defeated twice by Dwight D. Eisenhower for the U.S. presidency (1952 and 1956). Jimmy Walker was the dapper mayor of New York City, 1926–32. Charles Lindberg was the celebrated pilot who made the first nonstop trans-Atlantic flight from New York to Paris in 1927.

10. The reference is to the position Arnold took in *Culture and Anarchy* toward a bill introduced in Parliament in 1866 over whether a man would be permitted to marry his deceased wife’s sister. See CP, 118.

11. NF had been invited to teach courses on the history of criticism and on literature and myth at Harvard during the spring term of 1957. On the response to these courses, see Ayre, 256–8.

12. For NF’s notes on Surtees’s *Handley Cross*, see NB 41. On *Humphry Clinker* and *The Egotist*, see NB 36.33, 42. The notes on *Great Expectations*, mentioned also in NB 7.279, do not appear in the extant notebooks.

13. It was NF’s course in Nineteenth-Century Thought—on Burke, Newman, James Mill, J.S. Mill, Carlyle, Ruskin, Huxley, Arnold, and Butler.


17. On the dandy, see NF’s note in *AC*, 360.

18. Carlyle opposes the dandy to the drudge in *Sartor Resartus*, bk. 3, chap. 10.

19. NF changed the title from *Structural Poetics* to *Anatomy of Criticism* after he received word from the editorial board at Princeton University Press that the former was “not altogether satisfactory” (Benjamin F. Houston to NF, 14 October 1955, a letter in the NFF, 1988, box 61, file 3).

20. See *AC*, 99.


22. See n. 13, above.

23. The “Locke reading program,” mentioned a number of times in the notebooks, was a plan NF developed to read a number of nineteenth-century thinkers not a part of his course in nineteenth-century thought. He speaks several times of reading “back” from those writers to John Locke. The outline of this reading plan was, as NF describes in it one notebook, quite ambitious: it was to include works of philosophy, metaphysics, psychology, theology, occultism, political theory, economics, law, military history, other works of history and the philosophy of history, the development of symbolism in the arts, comparative religion, biology, anthropology, mathematics, chemistry, and anagogy (NB 32.28). On the Locke reading program, see also NB 17b.1, NB 18.29, 277, 292, NB 32.6, 14, and NB 42.1, 43 (all as yet unpublished).

24. That is, the projected books on prose and lyric will derive from the theory of genres in *AC*; those on epic and drama, from the theory of myths.

25. NF had given a lecture at Indiana School of Letters, Indiana University in July 1956 on “Literature as a Mode of Thought” (Ayre, 256). Karl Shapiro, along with Richard Ellmann and Richard Chase, also lectured at the 1956 session of the School of Letters.

26. See NF’s note in *AC*, 359.

27. *myelos* = descent to the underworld, as in bk 11 of the *Odyssey*.

28. *epiklesis* = invocation; in the Christian eucharistic prayer, it is a special invocation to the Holy Spirit.

29. It = NF’s course in “Nineteenth-Century Thought”; 4l, his course in “The History of English Literary Criticism.” Both were Honour courses.

30. NF comments on the parabasis for throughout NB 8, but see especially pars. 149–50.

31. Astraea, the daughter of Zeus and Themis, was the goddess of justice; Eris, the goddess of discord.


33. This material is in NB 7.260 (unpublished).

34. The phrase is from William Butler Yeats, *The Tower*, p. 3, l. 36.

35. Jupiter is the god of natural religion, necessity, and law in Shelley’s *Prometheus Unbound* (1820); Urizen—one of Blake’s Four Zoas—is force of “reason,” limitation, and vengeance in Blake’s prophesies; Arimanes, the principle of evil in ancient Persian religion, appears as a character Byron’s *Manfred* (1817); the Immanent Will, which appears in Hardy’s *The Dynasts* (1903–8) and elsewhere, is the blind and indifferent force that determines the fate of, and generally blights, human life.


37. See *Theodore Gaster, Theatre* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1961), passim. Gaster defines “toposcosm” as all of the animate and inanimate elements that characterize the atmosphere of a given locality (p. 24). NF adapts “toposcosm” for his own purposes in “New Directions from Old,” in *FI*, 63–6.

38. By “Draida analogy” NF means the religious myths and rituals of natural religion in its most primitive forms. In NB 21.311, NF calls the Druid analogy the “pagan synthesis.” In NB 11b.35 he calls it the “pagan synthesis.” For NF an analogy is never a genuine form.

39. To the left of the first five numbered sections of this entry, NF inserted in very small script, respectively, the abbreviations “rt,” “pe,” “gr,” “yi,” and “or.” These stand for red, purple, green, yellow, and orange, and are associated with the musical keys in parentheses at the end of each numbered section. The color associated with each musical key was for NF purely arbitrary, deriving, as he writes in NB 21.201 (unpublished), from the colors of wooden blocks he had as a child. The present entry begins NF’s use of the musical “circle of fifths” for outlining twenty-four parts in the first three divisions of his ogdoad: Liberal,
The Collected Works of Northrop Frye

Under the editorship of Alvin Lee, the publication of Frye's Collected Works is proceeding apace. Eight volumes have been published to date, several more are either imminent or well along in the editorial process, and the remainder are at various stages of completion. The volumes published to date are available from the University of Toronto Press at http://www.utpublishing.com


By Peter Yan

Among my family and friends, Northrop Frye, Canada’s greatest thinker, is the forbidden four letter F-word. No small talk, gossip, or conversation begins or ends without my mentioning his name. Back from the cottage? Frye says you re-enacted the Exodus story, escaping the city for your promised land. A fan of the Dougs, Flutie or Gilmour? Frye calls them the classic David/Goliath, underdog story. The success of The Blair Witch Project? Frye would say it is an ironic unhappy reversal of the Hansel/Gretel story, complete with witch, forest, trail of stones, and house. The demise of hockey czar, Alan Eagleson? Frye says life imitates literature, as Eagleson exploited players just like Bluebeard exploited his wives, until one dared to bring him down. My Ukrainian wife, Leah’s surprise “that the man of my dreams turns out to be a skinny Chinese guy.” Frye says beauty is not in the eye of the beholder, as my competition, the “tall, dark, and handsome” archetype, is, thankfully, a mass media construction.

Outside of the boxed holdings at University of Toronto’s Victoria College, Frye’s Alma Mater, one of the greatest collection of Frye paraphernalia—autographed books, tape recordings, photos, films, videos, lecture notes, juvenilia, short stories, cartoons, reviews, interviews, newsletters, even T-shirts—belongs to me, a skinny Canadian Born Chinese Guy (CBC for short; American Born Chinese are ABC’s). Frye fanatics at Victoria College were dubbed Fryedolators or Small Fryes. My best man, R. Bingham, christened me Stir Frye.

So, why do I, and so many others, love Frye? The short and long answer: he takes us everywhere we want to go. Today, on the 11th anniversary of his death, after the tributes of more qualified and distinguished academics and writers, I have finally gathered enough nerve to pay tribute to the greatest twentieth century-literary critic, on behalf of his favourite audience—the non-specialist, reading lay public.

Like many readers, I first encountered Frye in ENG 101, in “The Motive for Metaphor,” an essay I read out of patriotic duty, as he and Atwood were the only Canadians represented. Reading Frye reminded me when I first read the Book of Revelation: understanding little, but the incredible rush of striking metaphors—in an essay, no less—clustered in my brain, like a drug-induced dream, a Frye high for awakened minds. That piece led me to the rest of The Educated Imagination and his other works.

When I inquired about his latest work at an Eaton’s bookstore, the shocked saleswoman replied, “Are you really into Frye or are you just trying to pick me up?” Then, I learned that I, a CBC, could use Frye’s ideas like an aphrodisiac. A combination of the Polemical Introduction in his Anatomy of Criticism and a bottle of Italian red wine is, I later found, a devastating combination on any female intellectual.

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In a 3rd year Contemporary Literary Criticism course, one woman loved how I used Frye as a thread through the maze of warring critical schools. The renowned semiologist Roland Barthes is really deep down a French Frye, as his mythology is what Frye calls an applied mythology or ideology. Deconstruction is Frye’s theory in reverse, as Frye shows unity among differences in literature, while Deconstructivists show difference among unity. Frye is a post-structuralist, reversing the hierarchy of literature over criticism, as Frye inadvertently made literary criticism and literary critics as celebrated as literature and literary writers. Frye is the ultimate “both-and” post-modernist, as his work fuses both the sacred and the secular, mythos and logos, art
and social science, literary theory and imaginative vision; he writes, in Harold Bloom’s phrase, prose poems or verse criticism.

From Frye’s single sentences or paragraphs, other literary critics would build careers. Bloom’s greatest theory of how writers wrestle with the anxiety of influence from an earlier writer, whose work is misread and reconstructed by the later writer, Frye explained twenty-five years earlier in his first book *Fearful Symmetry*. A Bulgarian critic of Frye, Tzetvan Todorov examines fiction in terms of sentence structure (nouns=characters; verbs=character actions; adjectives=character attributes); Frye illustrates this technique in a 1954 essay parsing philosophy (noun=the material world; verb=spirit, energy, will; adjectives=universals; adverb=values; conjunctions=relations).

Everywhere I want to go, from the Bible to history, from philosophy to psychology, from Zen koans to the Shakespearean, Frye guides me, even into unexpected areas, like Canadian-Chinese culture. The question of the Canadian Identity is just as complicated as the question of the CBC Identity. Frye makes me feel both more Canadian and Chinese. Against a taunting racist, I quoted Frye’s idea that Canadian History included me, as Canada largely exists because of the quest for a Northwest Passage to the Orient.

Frye, too humble to admit it, is the synthesizing Critical Messiah he waited for in *Anatomy of Criticism*. His ideas inspired my high school students’ greatest revelations. In short, Frye helps my students see the role of literature in this mad, mad world; stories show us a world we want and do not want, reminding us that the basic needs for life come first—before any ideology. J. McGee, a former Grade 12 student of mine wrote, “Besides the fact that my (relatively) poor English mark costed me thousands of dollars in scholarship money. . . . you came closest to showing me how literature is just as important as math, computers and the sciences.” Frye’s writing is the operating system adaptable to any platform, the ultimate shareware, the great code which builds upon old programs and allows you to write new ones.

Everything I know I learned from Frye. Frye never wanted any disciples, as they usually betray you. He never wished anyone to centre on his work unless it meant genuine freedom for them. Frye freed a great many readers, not to mention writers.

On behalf of your readers, writers, and students, whom your work and life inspired, thank you Professor Northrop Frye. May you always accept in the best spirit, the small requital from your students, who periodically change the words carved above the Old Vic entrance, from *The Truth Shall Make You Free* to read *The Truth Shall Make You Frye*.

Rest in peace.

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